Doença de Minamata: diferenças entre revisões

Doença de Minamata
Especialidade	Toxicologia, neurologia, psiquiatria
Sintomas	Ataxia, hipoestesia, e fraqueza muscular
Complicações	Perda da visão periférica, danos à audição e fala; em casos extremos, insanidade, paralisia e coma; também pode afetar fetos
Início habitual	Logo após entrar em contato com a substância
Duração	Crônica
Causas	Intoxicação por mercúrio severa
Prognóstico	Taxa de letalidade de 35%
Classificação e recursos externos
CID-11	1975519045
DiseasesDB	001651
MedlinePlus	001651
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Revisão das 09h25min de 16 de maio de 2023

Doença de Minamata é uma doença neurológica causada pela intoxicação por mercúrio severa. Sinais e sintomas incluem ataxia, hipoestesia nas mãos e pés, fraqueza muscular geral, perda de visão periférica, danos à audição e fala. Em casos extremos, insanidade, paralisia, coma, e morte, ocorrem em semanas a partir do início dos sintomas. Uma forma congênita da doença afeta fetos no útero, causando microcefalia, dano cerebral extensivo, e sintomas similares à paralisia cerebral. A doença de Minamata foi descoberta pela primeira vez em Minamata, Kumamoto, Japão, em 1956. Causada pela contaminação por metil mercúrio através da água residual liberada da indústria química Chisso, que durou de 1932 à 1968. Também foi sugerido que parte do sulfato de mercurio(II) nas águas residuais foi também metabolizado para metil mercúrio pela bactéria no sedimento.^[1] Essa bioacumulação e magnificação trófica altamente tóxica em frutos do mar e peixes na baia de Minamata e no mar de Yatsushiro, provocou a intoxicação da população local através do consumo de alimentos da pesca. A intoxicação e morte resultante de humanos e animais continuou durante 36 anos, enquanto a corporação Chisso e o governo de Kumamoto esforçaram-se pouco para prevenir a contaminação. Os efeitos em animais foram severos o suficiente em gatos para provocar o que foi chamado de "febre dos gatos dançantes".^[2]

Até março de 2021, 2,265 vitimas foram oficialmente reconhecidas como possuindo a doença de Minamata,^[3] e mais de 10,000 receberam compensações financeiras da Chisso.^[4] Em 2004, a Chisso havia pago mais de $86 milhões em compensações, e no mesmo ano foi ordenada a limpar a contaminação.^[5] Em 29 de março de 2010, foi feito um acordo para compensar vitimas até então não certificadas.^[6]

Um segundo surto da doença de Minamata ocorreu na prefeitura de Niigata em 1965. A doença de Minamata original e a doença de Minamata-Niigata são consideradas duas das quatro grandes doenças de poluição do Japão.

1908–1955

Em 1908, a corporação Chisso abriu pela primeira vez uma fábrica, química em Minamata, na prefeitura de Kumamoto, localizada na costa ocidental da ilha de Kyūshū. Inicialmente dedicada à produção de fertilizantes, a fábrica logo seguiu a expansão nacional da indústria química no Japão, ramificando sua produção com acetileno, etanal, ácido acético, cloreto de vinila, e octanol, entre outras substâncias. A fábrica de Minamata tornou-se uma das mais avançadas em todo o Japão.^[7] Os dejetos resultantes da manufatura desses químicos eram despejados na Baia de Minamata através da água residual da fábrica. A poluição causou um impacto ambiental imediato, com uma perceptível redução na pesca local, que levou a fábrica à compensar cooperativas de pescadores em 1926 e 1943.^[8]

A rápida expansão da fábrica Chisso contribuiu para a economia local, criando uma maior prosperidade na prefeitura. Esse fato, combinado a ausência de outras indústrias locais, determinaram que a Chisso possuisse uma grande influência na cidade. Em um ponto da história, mais da metade da arrecação por taxas da administração local vinham da corporação e seus funcionários, enquanto que a companhia e seus subsidiários eram responsáveis por criar um quarto de todos os empregos em Minamata.^[9] A cidade foi até mesmo apelidada de 'cidade-castelo' da Chisso, em referência às cidades capitais dos lordes feudais que comandavam o Japão durante do período Edo.^[10]

A fábrica da Chisso iniciou a produção de etanal em 1932, com 210 toneladas por ano. Em 1951 a produção saltou para 6,000 toneladas e eventualmente atingiu 45,245 toneladas em 1960.^[11] O rendimento da fábrica representou histericamente um quarto e um terço da produção total de etanal do Japão. A reação química utilizada para produzir o etanal empregava o sulfato de mercurio(II) como catalisador. A partir de agosto de 1951, o co-catalisador foi alterado do dióxido de manganês para o sulfuro de ferro(III).^[12] Uma reação colateral nessa ciclo catalisador levou à produção de uma pequena quantidade (cerca de 5% do resultado^[13]) do composto orgânico de mercúrio metil mercúrio.^[14] Como resultado dessa mudança no catalisador, esse composto altamente tóxico foi despejado na Baia de Minamata regularmente entre 1951 e 1968, quando o método de produção foi finalmente descontinuado.^[15]

1956–1959

Em 21 de abril de 1956, uma menina de cinco anos foi examinada no hospital da fábrica Chisso. Os médicos ficaram perplexos com os sintomas: dificuldade para caminhar, dificuldade na fala, e convulsões. Dois dias depois, a irmã mais nova da menina também começou à exibir os mesmos sintomas e foi, também, hospitalizada. A mãe das meninas informou os doutores que a filho dos vizinhos também estava tendo problemas similares. Após uma investigação de casa em casa, mais oito pacientes foram descobertos e hospitalizados. Em 1 de maio, o diretor do hospital relatou ao departamente de saúde local a descoberta de uma "epidemia de uma doença desconhecida do sistema nervoso central", marcando a primeira descoberta oficial da doença de Minamata.^[16]

Para investigar a epidemia, o governo local e vários médicos formaram um Comitê de Contramedidas à Doença Desconhecida no fim de maio de 1956. Devido à natureza local da doença, suspeitava-se que fosse contagiosa, e como precaução os pacientes foram isolados e suas casas desinfectadas. Embora a tese do contágio tenha sido descartada logo depois, a resposta inicial contribuiu para a estigmatização e discriminação experimentada para sobreviventes de Minamata. Durante as investigações, o comitê descobriu as anedotas surpreendentes de evidências de comportamentos estranhos em gatos e outros animais silvestres em áreas entorno das casas dos pacientes. De 1950 em diante, os gatos foram vistos tendo convulsões, comportamentos insanos, e eventualmente morrendo. Os locais denominaram isso de "doença dos gatos dançantes", devido a seu movimento erratico.^[2] Na medida que a extensão do surto foi compreendida, o comitê convidou pesquisadores da Universidade de Kumamoto para ajudar no esforço de investigação.^[17]

O Grupo de Pesquisa da Universidade de Kumamoto foi formado em 24 de agosto de 1956. Pesquisadores da Escola de Medicina começaram à visitar Minamata regularmente, e admitiram os pacientes para o hospital universitário para exames detalhados. Uma imagem mais completa dos sintomas exibidos foi gradualmente formada. A doença desenvolvia-se sem nenhum sinal prévio, com pacientes reclamanda de uma perda de sensibilidade nas mãos e pés, tornando-se incapazes de pegar pequenos objetos ou apertar botões. Além disso, não conseguiam correr ou caminhar sem tropeçar, suas vozes mudaram de tom, e muitos pacientes reclaram de dificuldades de visão, audição, e em engolir. Em geral, essas sintomas pioravam e eram seguidos de graves convulsões, coma, e eventualmente morte. Em outubro de 1956, quarenta pacientes foram descobertos, dos quais 14 haviam morrido: um taxa de fatalidade alarmante de 35%.^[18]

Encontrando a causa

Pesquisadores de Kumadai também começaram a focar na causa da estranha doença. Eles descobriram que as vitimas, frequentemente membros da mesma família, concentravam-se em pontos de pesca na costa da Baia de Minamata. Peixes e frutos do mar locais formavam um elemento constante nas suas dietas. O gatos da área, que tendiam à comer restos de alimentos das famílias, haviam falecido com sintomas similares com os descobertos em humanos. Isso levou os pesquisadores a acreditar que o surto era causado por alguma forma de intoxicação alimentar, suspeitando principalmente da contaminação nos peixes e frutos do mar.

E 4 de novembro, o grupo de pesquisa anunciou suas descobertas iniciais: "A doença de Minamata é considerada uma intoxicação por um metais pesados, que presumivelmente adentra o corpo humano através, principalmente, de peixes e frutos do mar."^[19]

Identificação do mercúrio

Metil mercúrio, um composto orgânico de mercúrio despejado nas águas residuais da fábrica química, causa da doença de Minamata.

Logo que a investigação identificou um metal pesado como substância causal, a água residual da fábrica Chisso se tornou imediatamente suspeita. Os próprios testes da companhia revelaram que a água residual continha vários metais pesados em concentrações suficientes para causar impactos ambientais graves, incluindo chumbo, mercúrio, manganês, arsênio, thallium, e cobre, além do selênio calcogênio. Identificar qual toxina particular foi responsável pela doença provou-se extremamente difícil e trabalhoso. Durante os anos de 1957 e 1958, muitas teorias diferentes foram propostas por pesquisadores. Num primeiro momento, o manganês foi considerado a substância causal devido a alta concentração encontrada nos peixes e nos orgãos dos falecidos. Thallium, selênio, e múltiplos contaminantes foram avaliados, mas em março de 1958, o neurologia britânico Douglas McAlpine, que visitava a região, sugeriu que os sintomas de Minamata se assemelhavam aos da intoxicação por mercúrio, o que motivou um novo foco nas investigações.

Em fevereiro de 1959, a distribuição de mercúrio na Baia de Minamata foi investigada. Os resultados chocaram os pesquisadores envolvidos. Densas quantidades foram detectadas em peixes, frutos do mar, e no lodo da baia. A maior concentração ocorria entorno do canal de água residual da fábrica Chisso, no porto de Hyakken, e decrescia em direção ao oceano, claramente identificando a fábrica como fonte da contaminação. A poluição era tão pesada na entrada do canal, que foi avaliada em 2 kg por tonelada de sedimento, o suficiente para a mineração economicamente viável. Posteriormente, a Chisso instalou uma subsidiária para recuperar o mercúrio do lodo.^[20]

Amostras de cabelo foram retiradas de indivíduos com a doença, e também da população de Minamata em geral. Em paciente, o maior nível de mercúrio regitrado foi de 105 partes por milhão, indicando uma exposição pesada, enquanto que em residentes não-sintomáticos, o nível era de 191 ppm, comparado com o nível médio de 4 ppm para pessoas vivendo fora de Minamata.^[20] foetus from toxins in the bloodstream, which is indeed the case with most chemicals. What was not known at the time was that exactly the opposite is the case with methylmercury: the placenta removes it from the mother's bloodstream and concentrates the chemical in the foetus.

After several years of study and the autopsies of two children, the doctors announced that these children had an as-yet unrecognised congenital form of Minamata disease. The certification committee convened on 29 November 1962 and agreed that the two dead children and the sixteen children still alive should be certified as patients, and therefore liable for "sympathy" payments from Chisso, in line with the 1959 agreement.^[21]

Outbreak of Niigata Minamata disease

Minamata disease broke out again in 1965, this time along the banks of the Agano River in Niigata Prefecture. The polluting factory (owned by Showa Denko) employed a chemical process using a mercury catalyst very similar to that used by Chisso in Minamata. As in Minamata, from the autumn of 1964 to the spring of 1965, cats living along the banks of the Agano River had been seen to go mad and die. Before long, patients appeared with identical symptoms to patients living on the Shiranui Sea, and the outbreak was made public on 12 June 1965. Researchers from the Kumamoto University Research Group and Hajime Hosokawa (who had retired from Chisso in 1962) used their experience from Minamata and applied it to the Niigata outbreak. In September 1966, a report was issued proving Showa Denko's pollution to be the cause of this second Minamata disease outbreak.

Unlike the patients in Minamata, the victims of Showa Denko's pollution lived a considerable distance from the factory and had no particular link to the company. As a result, the local community was much more supportive of patients' groups and a lawsuit was filed against Showa Denko in March 1968, only three years after discovery.

The events in Niigata catalysed a change in response to the original Minamata incident. The scientific research carried out in Niigata forced a re-examination of that done in Minamata and the decision of Niigata patients to sue the polluting company allowed the same response to be considered in Minamata. Masazumi Harada has said that, "It may sound strange, but if this second Minamata disease had not broken out, the medical and social progress achieved by now in Kumamoto... would have been impossible."^[22]

Around this time, two other pollution-related diseases were also grabbing headlines in Japan. People with Yokkaichi asthma and itai-itai disease were forming citizens' groups and filed lawsuits against the polluting companies in September 1967 and March 1968, respectively. As a group, these diseases came to be known as the four big pollution diseases of Japan.^[23]

Slowly but surely, the mood in Minamata and Japan as a whole was shifting. Minamata patients found the public gradually becoming more receptive and sympathetic as the decade wore on. This culminated in 1968 with the establishment in Minamata of the Citizens' Council for Minamata Disease Countermeasures, which was to become the chief citizens' support group to the Minamata patients. A founding member of the citizens' council was Michiko Ishimure, a local housewife and poet who later that year published Pure Land, Poisoned Sea: Our Minamata disease, a book of poetic essays that received national acclaim.

1969–1973

Official government recognition

Finally on 26 September 1968 – twelve years after the discovery of the disease (and four months after Chisso had stopped production of acetaldehyde using its mercury catalyst) – the Japanese government issued an official conclusion as to the cause of Minamata disease:

Minamata disease is a disease of the central nervous system, a poisoning caused by long-term consumption, in large amounts, of fish and shellfish from Minamata Bay. The causative agent is methylmercury. Methylmercury produced in the acetaldehyde acetic acid facility of Shin Nihon Chisso's Minamata factory was discharged in factory wastewater... Minamata disease patients last appeared in 1960, and the outbreak has ended. This is presumed to be because consumption of fish and shellfish from Minamata Bay was banned in the fall of 1957, and the fact that the factory had waste-treatment facilities in place from January 1960.

The conclusion contained many factual errors: eating fish and shellfish from other areas of the Shiranui Sea, not just Minamata Bay, could cause the disease; eating small amounts, as well as large amounts of contaminated fish over a long time also produced symptoms; the outbreak had not, in fact, ended in 1960 nor had mercury-removing wastewater facilities been installed in January 1960. Nevertheless, the government announcement brought a feeling of relief to a great many victims and their families. Many felt vindicated in their long struggle to force Chisso to accept responsibility for causing the disease and expressed thanks that their plight had been recognised by their social superiors. The struggle now focused on to what extent the victims should be compensated.^[24]

Struggle for a new agreement

In light of the government announcement, the patients of the Mutual Aid Society decided to ask for a new compensation agreement with Chisso and submitted the demand on 6 October. Chisso replied that it was unable to judge what would be fair compensation and asked the Japanese government to set up a binding arbitration committee to decide. This proposal split the members of the patients' society, many of whom were extremely wary of entrusting their fate to a third party, as they had done in 1959 with unfortunate results. At a meeting on the 5 April 1969, the opposing views within the society could not be reconciled and the organisation split into the pro-arbitration group and the litigation group (who decided to sue the company). That summer, Chisso sent gifts to the families who opted for arbitration rather than litigation.

Ficheiro:Patients and family members hold photographs of their dead.jpg

Minamata patients and family members hold photographs of their dead during a demonstration (W. E. Smith)

An arbitration committee was duly set up by the Ministry of Health and Welfare on 25 April, but it took almost a year to draw up a draft compensation plan. A newspaper leak in March 1970 revealed that the committee would ask Chisso to pay only ¥2 million ($5,600) for dead patients and ¥140,000 to ¥200,000 ($390 to $560) per year to surviving patients. The arbitration group were dismayed by the sums on offer. They petitioned the committee, together with patients and supporters of the litigation group, for a fairer deal. The arbitration committee announced their compensation plan on 25 May in a disorderly session at the Ministry of Health and Welfare in Tokyo. Thirteen protesters were arrested.

Instead of accepting the agreement as they had promised, the arbitration group asked for increases. The committee was forced to revise its plan and the patients waited inside the ministry building for two days while they did so. The final agreement was signed on 27 May. Payments for deaths ranged from ¥1.7 million to ¥4 million ($4,700 to $11,100), one-time payments from ¥1 million to ¥4.2 million ($2,760 to $11,660) and annual payments between ¥170,000 and ¥380,000 ($470 to $1,100) for surviving patients. On the day of the signing, the Minamata Citizens' Council held a protest outside the Chisso factory gates. One of the Chisso trade unions held an eight-hour strike in protest at the poor treatment of the arbitration group by their own company.^[25]

The litigation group, representing 41 certified patients (17 already deceased) in 28 families, submitted their suit against Chisso in the Kumamoto District Court on 14 June 1969. The leader of the group, Eizō Watanabe (a former leader of the Mutual Aid Society), declared, "Today, and from this day forth, we are fighting against the power of the state." Those who decided to sue the company came under fierce pressure to drop their lawsuits. One woman was visited personally by a Chisso executive and harassed by her neighbours. She was blackballed by the community, her family's fishing boat used without permission, their fishing nets were cut, and human faeces were thrown at her in the street.^[26]

The litigation group and their lawyers were helped substantially by an informal national network of citizens' groups that had sprung up around the country in 1969. The Associations to Indict those Responsible for Minamata Disease were instrumental in raising awareness and funds for the lawsuit. The Kumamoto branch, in particular, was especially helpful to the case. In September 1969, they set up a Trial Research Group, which included law professors, medical researchers (including Harada), sociologists and even Michiko Ishimure to provide useful material to the lawyers to improve their legal arguments. Their report, Corporate Responsibility for Minamata Disease: Chisso's Illegal Acts,^[27] published in August 1970, formed the basis of the ultimately successful lawsuit.^[25]

The trial lasted almost four years. The litigation group's lawyers sought to prove Chisso's corporate negligence. Three main legal points had to be overcome to win the case. First, the lawyers had to show that methylmercury caused Minamata disease and that the company's factory was the source of pollution. The extensive research by Kumadai and the government's conclusion meant that this point was proved quite easily. Second, they needed to show that Chisso could and should have anticipated the effect of its wastewater and taken steps to prevent the tragedy (i.e., was the company negligent in its duty of care). Third, it had to disprove that the "sympathy money" agreement of 1959, which forbade the patients from claiming any further compensation, was a legally binding contract.

The trial heard from patients and their families, but the most important testimony came from Chisso executives and employees. The most dramatic testimony came from Hosokawa, who spoke on 4 July 1970 from his hospital bed where he was dying of cancer. Hosokawa explained his experiments with cats, including the infamous "cat 400", which developed Minamata disease after being fed factory wastewater. He also spoke of his opposition to the 1958 change in wastewater output route to Minamata River. Hosokawa's testimony was backed up by a colleague who also told how Chisso officials had ordered them to halt their cat experiments in the autumn of 1959. Hosokawa died three months after giving his testimony. Former factory manager Eiichi Nishida admitted that the company put profits ahead of safety, resulting in dangerous working conditions and a lack of care with mercury. Former Chisso President Kiichi Yoshioka admitted that the company promoted a theory of dumped World War II explosives, though it knew it to be unfounded.

The verdict handed down on 20 March 1973 represented a complete victory for the patients of the litigation group:

The defendant's factory was a leading chemical plant with the most advanced technology and ... should have assured the safety of its wastewater. The defendant could have prevented the occurrence of Minamata disease or at least have kept it at a minimum. We cannot find that the defendant took any of the precautionary measures called for in this situation whatsoever. The presumption that the defendant had been negligent from beginning to end in discharging wastewater from its acetaldehyde plant is amply supported. The defendant cannot escape liability for negligence.

The "sympathy money" agreement was found to be invalid and Chisso was ordered to make one-time payments of ¥18 million ($66,000) for each deceased patient and from ¥16 million to ¥18 million ($59,000 to $66,000) for each surviving patient. The total compensation of ¥937 million ($3.4 million) was the largest sum ever awarded by a Japanese court.^[28]

Uncertified patients' fight to be recognised

While the struggles of the arbitration and litigation groups against Chisso were continuing, a new group of individuals with Minamata disease emerged. To qualify for compensation under the 1959 agreement, patients had to be officially recognised by various ad hoc certification committees according to their symptoms. However, in an effort to limit the liability and financial burden on the company, these committees were sticking to a rigid interpretation of Minamata disease. They required that patients must exhibit all symptoms of Hunter-Russell syndrome – the standard diagnosis of organic mercury poisoning at the time, which originated from an industrial accident in the United Kingdom in 1940. The committee certified only patients exhibiting explicit symptoms of the British syndrome, rather than basing their diagnosis on the disease in Japan. This resulted in many applicants being rejected by the committee, leaving them confused and frustrated.^[29]

Legacies

Epidemiology

As of March 2001, 2,265 victims had been officially certified^[3] and over 10,000 people had received financial compensation from Chisso,^[4] although they were not recognised as official victims. The issue of quantifying the impact of Minamata disease is complicated, as a full epidemiological study has never been conducted and patients were recognised only if they voluntarily applied to a certification council to seek financial compensation.^[30]^[31] Many individuals with Minamata disease faced discrimination and ostracism from the local community if they came out into the open about their symptoms. Some people feared the disease to be contagious, and many local people were fiercely loyal to Chisso, depending on the company for their livelihoods. In this atmosphere, those affected were reluctant to come forward and seek certification. Despite these factors, over 17,000 people have applied to the council for certification. Also, in recognising an applicant as having Minamata disease, the certification council qualified that patient to receive financial compensation from Chisso. For that reason, the council has always been under immense pressure to reject claimants and minimise the financial burden placed on Chisso. Rather than being a council of medical recognition, the decisions of the council were always affected by the economic and political factors surrounding Minamata and the Chisso corporation. Furthermore, compensation of the victims led to continued strife in the community, including unfounded accusations that some of the people who sought compensation did not actually have the disease.^[32] More properly, the impact should be called a criminal 'poisoning', not a clinical 'disease'. These forms of obfuscation are commonly experienced by 'environmental victims' in many countries.^[33]

In 1978, the National Institute for Minamata Disease was established in Minamata. It consists of four departments: The Department of Basic Medical Science, The Department of Clinical Medicine, The Department of Epidemiology and The Department of International Affairs and Environmental Sciences.^[34] In 1986, The Institute became a WHO Collaborating Centre for Studies on the Health Effects of Mercury Compounds.^[35] The Institute seeks to improve medical treatment of Minamata disease patients and conducts research on mercury compounds and their impact on organisms as well as potential detoxification mechanisms. In April, 2008 the Institute invented a method for absorbing gaseous mercury in order to prevent air pollution and enable recycling of the metal.^[36]

Environmental protection

The movement for redress by Minamata victims and activists and the national outrage their movement elicited played a central role in the rise of environmental protection in Japan. The 1970 session of the Japanese Diet became remembered as the "Pollution Diet",^[37] as the Japanese government took action under rising pressure from the Minamata disease movement as well as other major environmental catastrophes such as Yokkaichi asthma and itai-itai disease. Fourteen new environmental laws were passed in a single session, giving Japan what at the time were the most stringent environmental protection laws in the world.^[37] These new laws included a Water Pollution Act and nationwide regulations of toxic discharges. The "polluter pays" principle was introduced. A national Environmental Agency, which later developed into the Ministry of Environment, was founded in 1971.^[38] National governmental expenditures on environmental issues almost doubled between 1970 and 1975 and tripled at the local government level.

Democratizing effects

According to historian Timothy S. George, the environmental protests that surrounded the disease appeared to aid in the democratization of Japan.^[39] When the first cases were reported and subsequently suppressed, the rights of the victims were not recognised, and they were given no compensation. Instead, the affected were ostracised from their community due to ignorance about the disease, as people were afraid that it was contagious.

The people directly impacted by the pollution of Minamata Bay were not originally allowed to participate in actions that would affect their future. Disease victims, fishing families, and company employees were excluded from the debate. Progress occurred when Minamata victims were finally allowed to come to a meeting to discuss the issue. As a result, postwar Japan took a small step toward democracy.

Through the evolution of public sentiments, the victims and environmental protesters were able to acquire standing and proceed more effectively in their cause. The involvement of the press also aided the process of democratization because it caused more people to become aware of the facts of Minamata disease and the pollution that caused it. However, although the environmental protests did result in Japan becoming more democratized, it did not completely rid Japan of the system that first suppressed the fishermen and individuals with Minamata disease.

Popular culture

Toshiko Akiyoshi, touched by the plight of the fishing village, wrote a jazz suite, "Minamata", that was to be the central piece of the Toshiko Akiyoshi-Lew Tabackin Big Band's 1976 album on RCA, Insights. The piece was constructed in three parts, to musically reflect the tragedy – "Peaceful Village", "Prosperity & Consequence", and "Epilogue". Akiyoshi used Japanese vocalists to sing the Japanese lyrics of a tone poem that were part of the composition. The album won many awards in jazz circles, including Downbeat's best album award, largely on the strength of this piece, which brought some further attention to the tragedy.^[40] Insights (Toshiko Akiyoshi – Lew Tabackin Big Band)

The song "Kepone Factory" on Dead Kennedys' In God We Trust, Inc. makes reference to the disaster in its chorus.

The song "The Disease of the Dancing Cats" by the band Bush on the album The Science of Things is in reference to the disaster.

Visual documentation

Photographic documentation of Minamata started in the early 1960s. One photographer who arrived in 1960 was Shisei Kuwabara, straight from university and photo school, who had his photographs published in Weekly Asahi as early as May 1960. The first exhibition of his photographs of Minamata was held in the Fuji Photo Salon in Tokyo in 1962, and the first of his book-length anthologies, Minamata Disease, was published in Japan in 1965. He has returned to Minamata many times since.^[41]

A dramatic photographic essay by W. Eugene Smith brought world attention to Minamata disease. He and his Japanese wife lived in Minamata from 1971 to 1973. The most famous and striking photo of the essay, Tomoko and Mother in the Bath (1972), shows Ryoko Kamimura holding her severely deformed daughter, Tomoko, in a Japanese bath chamber. Tomoko was poisoned by methylmercury while still in the womb. The photo was very widely published. It was posed by Smith with the co-operation of Ryoko and Tomoko to dramatically illustrate the consequences of the disease. It has subsequently been withdrawn from circulation at the request of Tomoko's family, so does not appear in recent anthologies of Smith's works.^[42] Smith and his wife were extremely dedicated to the cause of the people with Minamata disease, closely documenting their struggle for recognition and right to compensation. Smith was himself attacked and seriously injured by Chisso employees in an incident in Goi, Ichihara city, near Tokyo on January 7, 1972, in an attempt to stop the photographer from further revealing the issue to the world.^[43] The 54-year-old Smith survived the attack, but his sight in one eye deteriorated and his health never fully recovered before his death in 1978. Johnny Depp plays W. Eugene Smith in Minamata (2020) a drama based on the book written by Smith's wife.

Japanese photographer Takeshi Ishikawa, who assisted Smith in Minamata, has since exhibited his own photographs documenting the disease. His photographs cover the years 1971 to the present, with Minamata victims as his subjects.^[44]

The prominent Japanese documentary filmmaker Noriaki Tsuchimoto made a series of films, starting with Minamata: The Victims and Their World (1971) and including The Shiranui Sea (1975), documenting the incident and siding with the victims in their struggle against Chisso and the government.

Kikujiro Fukushima, a well-known Japanese photographer and journalist, published a series of photographs in 1980 concerning pollution in Japan, including Minamata disease. Some negatives of these photos are available on the website, and Kyodo News Images holds the rights to them.

Today

Minamata disease remains an important issue in contemporary Japanese society. Lawsuits against Chisso and the prefectural and national governments are still continuing and many regard the government responses to date as inadequate.^[45] The company's "historical overview" in its current website makes no mention of their role in the mass contamination of Minamata and the dreadful aftermath.^[46] Their 2004 Annual Report, however, reports an equivalent of about US$50 million (5,820 million yen) in "Minamata Disease Compensation Liabilities". From 2000 to 2003, the company also reported total compensation liabilities of over US$170 million. Their 2000 accounts also show that the Japanese and Kumamoto prefectural governments waived an enormous US$560 million in related liabilities. Their FY2004 and FY2005 reports refer to Minamata disease as "mad hatter's disease", a term coined from the mercury poisoning experienced by hat-makers of the last few centuries (cf. Erethism).^[47]

A memorial service was held at the Minamata Disease Municipal Museum on 1 May 2006 to mark 50 years since the official discovery of the disease. Despite bad weather, the service was attended by over 600 people, including Chisso chairman Shunkichi Goto and Environment Minister Yuriko Koike.^[48]

On Monday, March 29, 2010, a group of 2,123 uncertified victims reached a settlement with the government of Japan, the Kumamoto Prefectural government, and Chisso Corporation to receive individual lump-sum payments of 2.1 million yen and monthly medical allowances.^[6]^[49]

Most congenital patients are now Predefinição:When in their forties and fifties and their health is deteriorating. Their parents, who are often their only source of care, are into their seventies or eighties or already deceased. Often, these patients find themselves tied to their own homes and the care of their family, effectively isolated from the local community. Some welfare facilities for patients do exist. One notable example is Hot House, a vocational training centre for congenital patients as well as other disabled people in the Minamata area. Hot House members are also involved in raising awareness of Minamata disease, often attending conferences and seminars as well as making regular visits to elementary schools throughout Kumamoto Prefecture.^[50] -->

Ver também

Doença de Itai-itai

Referências

↑ Hamdy MK, Noyes OR (1975). «Formation of Methyl Mercury by Bacteria». Appl. Microbiol. 30 (3): 424–432. PMC 187198. PMID 1180551. doi:10.1128/AEM.30.3.424-432.1975 and references therein.
↑ ^a ^b Withrow SJ, Vail DM (2007). Withrow and MacEwen's Small Animal Clinical Oncology 4th ed. St. Louis, MO: Elsevier. pp. 73–4. ISBN 978-0-721-60558-6 Verifique o valor de |url-access=limited (ajuda)
↑ ^a ^b Official government figure as of March 2001. See "Minamata Disease: The History and Measures, ch2"
↑ ^a ^b See "Minamata Disease Archives" Arquivado em 2016-03-03 no Wayback Machine, Frequently asked questions, Question 6
↑ Jane Hightower (2008). Diagnosis Mercury: Money, Politics and Poison, Island Press, p. 77.
↑ ^a ^b "Agreement reached to settle Minamata suit", Asahi Shimbun news, 31 March 2010, retrieved 1 April 2010
↑ Nabi, Shabnum (2014). «Methylmercury and Minamata Disease». Toxic Effects of Mercury (em inglês). [S.l.]: Springer, New Delhi. pp. 187–199. ISBN 9788132219217. doi:10.1007/978-81-322-1922-4_25
↑ Harada, p15
↑ George, pp35-36
↑ George, p26
↑ Report of the Social Scientific Study Group on Minamata Disease, In the Hope of Avoiding Repetition of a Tragedy of Minamata Disease, National Institute for Minamata Disease, p. 13.
↑ Eto et al. (2010)
↑ Clark RB. (1997). Marine Pollution 4th ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 161 páginas. ISBN 978-0-198-50069-8
↑ For further information on the chemistry of the reaction that lead to the production of methylmercury see "Information on Mercury" Arquivado em 2011-07-11 no Wayback Machine by Mercury Technology Services, retrieved around the 24 October 2006
↑ Gilhooly, Rob, "Mercury rising: Niigata struggles to bury its Minamata ghosts", Japan Times, 13 June 2015
↑ Harada, p10
↑ Nicol, C.W., "Minamata: a saga of suffering and hope", Japan Times, 7 October 2012, p. 10
↑ Harada, pp23-24
↑ Harada, pp26-27
↑ ^a ^b Harada, p50
↑ Harada, pp68-77
↑ Harada, p90
↑ George, pp174-175
↑ George, pp187-190
↑ ^a ^b George, pp191-202 (Arbitration Group)
↑ George, p205
↑ Corporate Responsibility for Minamata Disease: Chisso's Illegal Acts (水俣病に対する企業の責任：チッソの不法行為, Minamata-byō ni Tai Suru Kigyō no Sekinin: Chisso no Fuhō Kōi^?)
↑ George, pp241-249
↑ Harada, pp156-157 and George, p208
↑ See "Mercury poisoning of thousands confirmed" by Jonathan Watts, The Guardian, 16 October 2001, retrieved 24 October 2006.
↑ Kawamura, Hiroki (2017). «The relation between law and technology in Japan: liability for technology-related mass damage in the cases of Minamata disease, asbestos, and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster». Contemporary Japan. 30 (1): 3–27. doi:10.1080/18692729.2018.1423459
↑ See "Ten Things to Know about Minamata Disease" Arquivado em 2012-07-25 no Wayback Machine by Soshisha – The Supporting Center for Minamata Disease
↑ Williams, C. (1998) Environmental Victims: New Risks new Injustice. London Earthscan.
↑ «National Institute For Minamata Disease». Consultado em 11 October 2012 Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
↑ «WHO Collaborating Centres Global database». World Health Organisation. Consultado em 11 October 2012 Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
↑ «Espacenet Patent search». European Patent Office. Consultado em 11 October 2012 Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
↑ ^a ^b Kapur, Nick (2018). Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 272 páginas. ISBN 9780674988484
↑ «Environmental Protection Policy in Japan - Introduction». Ministry of the Environment, Japan. Consultado em 13 October 2012 Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
↑ George, Timothy S. (2001). Minamata: Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Postwar Japan. Harvard University Asia Center. ISBN 0-674-00785-9.
↑ Record Review magazine vol 2 no 3 August 1978 – Scott Yanow; Downbeat (http://www.downbeat.com/default.asp?sect=stories&subsect=story_detail&sid=704); liner notes for Toshiko Akiyoshi/Lew Tabackin Big Band LP, Insights 1976 RCA VICTOR AFL1-2678 STEREO
↑ "Shisei Kuwabara – 'Minamata': The Starting point of the work of the photojournalist, Shisei Kuwabara", KMoPA. (In Japanese, despite the English title.) Accessed 4 January 2012.
↑ Read the thoughts of a photography magazine editor surrounding the controversy of the photograph's withdrawal: "Tomoko Uemura, R.I.P." by Jim Hughes, The Digital Journalist, retrieved 24 October 2006.
↑ Smith, pp94-95
↑ Hirano, Keiji, "Life with Minamata disease in photos", Japan Times, 15 November 2012, p. 3
↑ "Minamata's latest chapter", Japan Times editorial, 3 October 2006, retrieved 29 October 2006 (free registration required)
↑ Chisso Corporation. «Historical Overview». Chisso Corporation official site. Chisso. Consultado em 8 May 2013 Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
↑ FY2004 and FY2005 financial results. URL retrieved 2008-03-07.
↑ "Memorial service marks Minamata tragedy's 50th year", Japan Times, 2 May 2006, retrieved 29 October 2006 (free registration required)
↑ Hirano, Keiji, Kyodo News, "Mercury pact falls short on Minamata", Japan Times, 1 March 2012, p. 3.
↑ "Advanced welfare should arise from Minamata" by Takeko Kato, Asahi Shimbun, 10 May 2006, retrieved 29 October 2006

Leituras adicionais

"Minamata Disease: The History and Measures", The Ministry of the Environment, (2002), retrieved 17 January 2007
"Minamata Disease Archives" by the National Institute for Minamata Disease, retrieved 29 October 2006
Harada, Masazumi. (1972). Minamata Disease. Kumamoto Nichinichi Shinbun Centre & Information Center/Iwanami Shoten Publishers. ISBN 4-87755-171-9 C3036
George, S. Timothy. (2001). Minamata: Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Postwar Japan. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-00785-9
Ui, Jun. (1992). Industrial Pollution in Japan. United Nations University Press. ISBN 92-808-0548-7. Chapter 4, section IV
Smith, W. E. and Smith, A. M. (1975). Minamata. Chatto & Windus, Ltd. (London), ISBN 0-7011-2131-9
Eto, K., Marumoto, M. and Takeya, M. (2010) "The pathology of methylmercury poisoning (Minamata disease)", retrieved 7 December 2013
Oiwa, Keibo. (2001). Rowing the Eternal Sea: The Story of a Minamata Fisherman. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. ISBN 0-7425-0021-7
Steingraber, Sandra. (2001). Having Faith: An Ecologist Journey to Motherhood. Perseus Publishing. ISBN 0-425-18999-6
Approaches to Water Pollution Control, Minamata City, Kumamoto Prefecture
Allchin, Douglas. The Poisoning of Minamata
Saito, Hisashi. (2009). Niigata Minamata Disease: Methyl Mercury Poisoning in Niigata, Japan. Niigata Nippo.
Walker, Brett. (2010) "Toxic Archipelago: A History of Industrial Disease in Japan." University of Washington Press. ISBN 0-295-98954-8

Ligações externas

[1] Hamdy MK, Noyes OR (1975). «Formation of Methyl Mercury by Bacteria». Appl. Microbiol. 30 (3): 424–432. PMC 187198. PMID 1180551. doi:10.1128/AEM.30.3.424-432.1975 and references therein.

[withrow-2] Withrow SJ, Vail DM (2007). Withrow and MacEwen's Small Animal Clinical Oncology 4th ed. St. Louis, MO: Elsevier. pp. 73–4. ISBN 978-0-721-60558-6 Verifique o valor de |url-access=limited (ajuda)

[officialnumbers-3] Official government figure as of March 2001. See "Minamata Disease: The History and Measures, ch2"

[compensationnumbers-4] See "Minamata Disease Archives" Arquivado em 2016-03-03 no Wayback Machine, Frequently asked questions, Question 6

[5] Jane Hightower (2008). Diagnosis Mercury: Money, Politics and Poison, Island Press, p. 77.

[asahi.com-6] "Agreement reached to settle Minamata suit", Asahi Shimbun news, 31 March 2010, retrieved 1 April 2010

[7] Nabi, Shabnum (2014). «Methylmercury and Minamata Disease». Toxic Effects of Mercury (em inglês). [S.l.]: Springer, New Delhi. pp. 187–199. ISBN 9788132219217. doi:10.1007/978-81-322-1922-4_25

[8] Harada, p15

[9] George, pp35-36

[10] George, p26

[11] Report of the Social Scientific Study Group on Minamata Disease, In the Hope of Avoiding Repetition of a Tragedy of Minamata Disease, National Institute for Minamata Disease, p. 13.

[12] Eto et al. (2010)

[13] Clark RB. (1997). Marine Pollution 4th ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 161 páginas. ISBN 978-0-198-50069-8

[14] For further information on the chemistry of the reaction that lead to the production of methylmercury see "Information on Mercury" Arquivado em 2011-07-11 no Wayback Machine by Mercury Technology Services, retrieved around the 24 October 2006

[15] Gilhooly, Rob, "Mercury rising: Niigata struggles to bury its Minamata ghosts", Japan Times, 13 June 2015

[16] Harada, p10

[17] Nicol, C.W., "Minamata: a saga of suffering and hope", Japan Times, 7 October 2012, p. 10

[18] Harada, pp23-24

[19] Harada, pp26-27

[Harada,_p50-20] Harada, p50

[21] Harada, pp68-77

[22] Harada, p90

[23] George, pp174-175

[24] George, pp187-190

[arb-25] George, pp191-202 (Arbitration Group)

[26] George, p205

[27] Corporate Responsibility for Minamata Disease: Chisso's Illegal Acts (水俣病に対する企業の責任：チッソの不法行為, Minamata-byō ni Tai Suru Kigyō no Sekinin: Chisso no Fuhō Kōi^?)

[28] George, pp241-249

[29] Harada, pp156-157 and George, p208

[Guardian1-30] See "Mercury poisoning of thousands confirmed" by Jonathan Watts, The Guardian, 16 October 2001, retrieved 24 October 2006.

[31] Kawamura, Hiroki (2017). «The relation between law and technology in Japan: liability for technology-related mass damage in the cases of Minamata disease, asbestos, and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster». Contemporary Japan. 30 (1): 3–27. doi:10.1080/18692729.2018.1423459

[32] See "Ten Things to Know about Minamata Disease" Arquivado em 2012-07-25 no Wayback Machine by Soshisha – The Supporting Center for Minamata Disease

[33] Williams, C. (1998) Environmental Victims: New Risks new Injustice. London Earthscan.

[34] «National Institute For Minamata Disease». Consultado em 11 October 2012 Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)

[35] «WHO Collaborating Centres Global database». World Health Organisation. Consultado em 11 October 2012 Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)

[EPO-36] «Espacenet Patent search». European Patent Office. Consultado em 11 October 2012 Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)

[Kapur_272-37] Kapur, Nick (2018). Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 272 páginas. ISBN 9780674988484

[38] «Environmental Protection Policy in Japan - Introduction». Ministry of the Environment, Japan. Consultado em 13 October 2012 Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)

[George-39] George, Timothy S. (2001). Minamata: Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Postwar Japan. Harvard University Asia Center. ISBN 0-674-00785-9.

[40] Record Review magazine vol 2 no 3 August 1978 – Scott Yanow; Downbeat (http://www.downbeat.com/default.asp?sect=stories&subsect=story_detail&sid=704); liner notes for Toshiko Akiyoshi/Lew Tabackin Big Band LP, Insights 1976 RCA VICTOR AFL1-2678 STEREO

[kmopa-41] "Shisei Kuwabara – 'Minamata': The Starting point of the work of the photojournalist, Shisei Kuwabara", KMoPA. (In Japanese, despite the English title.) Accessed 4 January 2012.

[Tomoko-42] Read the thoughts of a photography magazine editor surrounding the controversy of the photograph's withdrawal: "Tomoko Uemura, R.I.P." by Jim Hughes, The Digital Journalist, retrieved 24 October 2006.

[43] Smith, pp94-95

[44] Hirano, Keiji, "Life with Minamata disease in photos", Japan Times, 15 November 2012, p. 3

[45] "Minamata's latest chapter", Japan Times editorial, 3 October 2006, retrieved 29 October 2006 (free registration required)

[46] Chisso Corporation. «Historical Overview». Chisso Corporation official site. Chisso. Consultado em 8 May 2013 Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)

[47] FY2004 and FY2005 financial results. URL retrieved 2008-03-07.

[48] "Memorial service marks Minamata tragedy's 50th year", Japan Times, 2 May 2006, retrieved 29 October 2006 (free registration required)

[49] Hirano, Keiji, Kyodo News, "Mercury pact falls short on Minamata", Japan Times, 1 March 2012, p. 3.

[50] "Advanced welfare should arise from Minamata" by Takeko Kato, Asahi Shimbun, 10 May 2006, retrieved 29 October 2006

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