Saltar para o conteúdo

Privatização da água: diferenças entre revisões

Origem: Wikipédia, a enciclopédia livre.
Conteúdo apagado Conteúdo adicionado
ZacTobias (discussão | contribs)
m
ZacTobias (discussão | contribs)
Etiquetas: Inserção de predefinição obsoleta Editor Visual: Trocado
Linha 81: Linha 81:


Entretanto, 84% dos contratos adjudicados principalmente nos anos 90 ainda estavam ativos. Por outro lado, em muitos países, como no Japão, Canadá, Egito, Paquistão ou Escandinávia, não existem empresas privadas de água. Nicarágua, Holanda e Uruguai até aprovaram leis que proíbem a privatização da água.<ref>No Uruguai, um referendo iniciado pela sociedade civil proibindo a privatização da água foi aprovado em outubro de 2004. A lei que proíbe a privatização do abastecimento público de água nos Países Baixos foi aprovada em setembro de 2004, com amplo apoio interpartidário.</ref> Na Itália, em junho de 2011, uma lei a favor da privatização da água foi revogada por uma maioria esmagadora de italianos através de um referendo.<ref>{{Citar jornal|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13741105|titulo=Berlusconi accepts nuclear blow|data=2011-06-14|acessodata=2020-04-03|website=BBC News|lingua=en-GB}}</ref> Em 2019, Baltimore, Maryland tornou-se a primeira grande cidade dos Estados Unidos a proibir a privatização da água.<ref>{{Citar jornal|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-water-cities/baltimore-votes-to-become-first-large-u-s-city-to-ban-water-privatization-idUSKCN1NC2O4|titulo=Baltimore votes to become first large U.S. city to ban water privatization|data=7 November 2018|acessodata=2019-04-06|website=Reuters}}</ref>
Entretanto, 84% dos contratos adjudicados principalmente nos anos 90 ainda estavam ativos. Por outro lado, em muitos países, como no Japão, Canadá, Egito, Paquistão ou Escandinávia, não existem empresas privadas de água. Nicarágua, Holanda e Uruguai até aprovaram leis que proíbem a privatização da água.<ref>No Uruguai, um referendo iniciado pela sociedade civil proibindo a privatização da água foi aprovado em outubro de 2004. A lei que proíbe a privatização do abastecimento público de água nos Países Baixos foi aprovada em setembro de 2004, com amplo apoio interpartidário.</ref> Na Itália, em junho de 2011, uma lei a favor da privatização da água foi revogada por uma maioria esmagadora de italianos através de um referendo.<ref>{{Citar jornal|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13741105|titulo=Berlusconi accepts nuclear blow|data=2011-06-14|acessodata=2020-04-03|website=BBC News|lingua=en-GB}}</ref> Em 2019, Baltimore, Maryland tornou-se a primeira grande cidade dos Estados Unidos a proibir a privatização da água.<ref>{{Citar jornal|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-water-cities/baltimore-votes-to-become-first-large-u-s-city-to-ban-water-privatization-idUSKCN1NC2O4|titulo=Baltimore votes to become first large U.S. city to ban water privatization|data=7 November 2018|acessodata=2019-04-06|website=Reuters}}</ref>

'''EM TRADUÇÃO'''

A World Bank report lists the following examples of successful public-private partnerships in developing countries: the full privatization in [[Water privatization in Chile|Chile]]; the mixed companies in [[Water privatization in Colombia|Colombia]]; the concessions in Guayaquil in Ecuador, [[Water privatization in Brazil|Brazil]], [[Water privatization in Argentina|Argentina]], Eastern Manila in the [[Water privatization in the Philippines|Philippines]], [[Water privatization in Morocco|Morocco]], and Gabun; and the lease contracts in Côte d'Ivoire, [[Water supply and sanitation in Senegal|Senegal]], and Yerevan in [[Water privatization in Armenia|Armenia]].<ref name="ppiaf.org2"/>

===Small-scale operators: the other private sector===
[[File:A water tanker.jpg|left|thumb|A small scale private operator using a water tanker to distribute water]]
Beyond water privatization, which involves contractual relationships between a government and formally established large companies, there is also "the other private sector" in water supply consisting of small-scale, often informal local operators. They exist in most cities in the Global South and sometimes provide a large portion of the city's population with water. For example, a study of six Latin American countries showed that they provide water to 25% of the population in seven cities.<ref>{{cite web|last=Solo|first=Tova|year=2003|title=Independent water entrepreneurs in Latin America – the other private sector in water services|url=http://water.worldbank.org/water/publications/independent-water-entrepreneurs-latin-america-other-private-sector-water-services|access-date=18 June 2011|publisher=World Bank}}</ref><ref>The study covered Córdoba, Argentina; Barranquilla, Colombia; Asunción, Paraguay; Guatemala City, Guatemala; and three cities in Peru (Lima, Cuzco and Ica). The cooperative of Santa Cruz, Bolivia, is also covered in the study, but is a special case, since it serves the entire city and operates more like a formal utility.</ref> In Africa, they serve an estimated 50% of the urban population.<ref name=":02" /> They mainly operate in slums, serving the people who are not catered to by the city authorities.<ref name=":02" /> Many small-scale water operators provide water through tanker trucks or animal-drawn carts. Others operate water distribution networks fed by wells, as it is the case in Asunción, Paraguay, and in Sanaa, Yemen. Small-scale operators can be owned by individual entrepreneurs or can take the form of cooperatives, as it is the case in Honduras. Small-scale operators do not always comply with technical norms and the quality of the water they provide or their tariffs are often not regulated. More often than not, their tariffs are significantly higher than those of public water utilities.<ref name=":02" /> This can attributed to either profiteering or simply the high transportation costs expended during the distribution of water.<ref name=":02" /> They typically lack capital to further expand their network. However, in a few pilot cases – such as in Kenya, Uganda, Cambodia and Vietnam – international aid agencies have provided them with grants to increase access, often in the form of [[output-based aid]].<ref>{{cite web|title=Supporting small providers in poor and underserved communities|url=http://water.worldbank.org/water/node/83793|access-date=18 June 2011|publisher=World Bank}}</ref>

==Selecting private operators==
Private companies are typically selected through international competitive bidding and need to have demonstrated previous experience. Selection is either done through a combination of price and quality, or solely based on price. In the case of a management contract, the price is the management fee (fixed fee plus performance-based fee); in the case of a lease it is the lease fee per unit of water sold; in a concession it is the [[water tariff]]; and in an asset sale it is the price paid for the company.<ref>{{cite web|title=Approaches to Private Participation in Water Services – A Toolkit |url=http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/Toolkits/Water/Water_Full.pdf|publisher=World Bank/Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility |pages=167–179 |access-date=18 June 2011}}</ref> In some cases – such as in Casablanca in 1997 and in Jakarta in 1998 – private companies have been selected through direct negotiations without competitive bidding. In other cases – such as in Cartagena (Colombia) in 1995, Cochabamba (Bolivia) in 1999 and Guayaquil (Ecuador) in 2000 – only a single bid was submitted. If development aid agencies are involved in directly financing private sector participation, they systematically require competitive bidding. However, in some cases – such as in Timişoara, Romania – the [[European Bank for Reconstruction and Development]] has financed parallel investments, while a concession was awarded by the government after direct negotiations.<ref>{{cite web|last=Lobina|first=Emanuele|author2=Hall, David |title=Problems with private water concessions: a review of experience|url=http://www.psiru.org/reports/2003-06-W-over.doc|date=June 2003|publisher=Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU), University of Greenwich|pages=6–7|access-date=18 June 2011}}</ref>

==Forms of regulation==
Being monopolies, all water utilities – public or private – need to be regulated concerning tariff approvals, service quality, environmental compliance and other aspects. The awareness for the need to regulate typically increases substantially when profit-oriented private operators become involved: Monitoring the performance of both the private and the public partner, applying sanctions in case of non-compliance and dispute resolution become particularly important. The regulatory tasks depend on the form of private sector participation: Under a management contract the monitoring of the achievement of performance standards, on which the remuneration of the private company depends, is typically carried out by an independent consulting firm. Under a concession contract or in the case of an asset sale, tariff regulation through a regulatory agency or the government is a key regulatory function. Water concessions are frequently renegotiated, often resulting in better terms for the private company. For example, negotiations of concessions in Buenos Aires and Manila resulted in investment requirements being reduced, tariffs being increased and tariffs being indexed to the exchange rate to the US dollar.<ref>{{cite web |last=Lobina |first=Emanuele |author2=Hall, David |title=Problems with private water concessions: a review of experience |url=http://www.psiru.org/reports/2003-06-W-over.doc |date=June 2003 |publisher=Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU), University of Greenwich |pages=10–12 |access-date=18 June 2011}}</ref> The quality and strength of regulation is an important factor that influences whether water privatization fails or succeeds.<ref>Gunatilake, Herath and Mary Jane F. Carangal–San Jose:[http://www.adb.org/Documents/ERD/Working_Papers/Wp115.pdf Privatization Revisited: Lessons from Private Sector Participation in Water Supply and Sanitation in Developing Countries], [[Asian Development Bank]], ERD Working Paper No. 115, 2008, p. 19.</ref> The tasks, form and capacity of the public entities charged with regulation vary greatly between countries.

Globally, regulation of private water companies is being carried out by the following types of public entities or, sometimes, a combination of them.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Type of entity charged with the regulation of private water providers !! Examples
|-
| Municipality or an association of smaller municipalities || France and Spain
|-
| Specialized body at the city level set up to regulate a single contract || Guayaquil, Ecuador; San Pedro Sula, Honduras; Jakarta, Indonesia (with some control by the national government in the latter case); Manila, Philippines; formerly in Buenos Aires, Argentina
|-
| Specialized regulatory agency at the supra-municipal sub-national level || [[Public utilities commission|Public Utilities Commissions]] in U.S. states; some Brazilian states
|-
| Specialized regulatory agency set up permanently under law at the country level || [[OFWAT]] in England; Water Superintendency SISS in Chile; Water Regulatory Commission CRA in Colombia
|-
| Specialized unit in a Ministry set up temporarily by decree || Ministry of Water in Jordan
|-
| Ministerial department || Ministry of Interior in Morocco
|}

==Examples of privatization==
The best-known examples of water privatization in the late 20th century are those undertaken in England under Margaret Thatcher, the Manila and Buenos Aires concessions as well as the failed privatization in Cochabamba, Bolivia, which became a symbol of the struggle against globalization. Less well known, but just as relevant, are water privatizations in other countries, such as in Colombia.

===France===
{{Main|Water privatization in France}}
Private water firms have had a dominant role in France for more than a century. Private water firms ([[Veolia Water]], [[Suez Environnement]] and smaller peers such as Saur) control 60 percent of France's water market. Veolia and Suez are the world's largest private international water and wastewater firms.<ref>[http://in.reuters.com/article/water-utilities-paris-idINL6N0PE57220140708 Paris's return to public water supplies makes waves beyond France]</ref>

Water privatization in France has been going on from before the 1800s but only recently, around the 1960s, has it grown in size and power. In the 20 years between the 1950s and 1970s it is estimated that the private water sector increased its share of potable water supply by at least 20%, a figure that has increased to around 75% in the current present. The water supply is now owned by three major companies. In the 3600 local municipalities in France each of them has the power to decide whether or not they publicize or privatize drinking water and dictate the terms of the contract.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Neto|first=Frederico|date=May 1998|title=Water privatization and regulation in England and France: a tale of two models|journal=Natural Resources Forum|volume=22|issue=2|pages=107–117|doi=10.1111/j.1477-8947.1998.tb00718.x|issn=0165-0203}}</ref>

The funding of French Water Agencies is completely done in by themselves. Meaning that these companies are self-funded. The total revenue is hard to estimate but from 1992 to 1996 around 81 Billion French Francs were held in revenue by these Water Agencies. This large fund is mostly used to expand and maintain public and private water projects. This model, although very profitable, lacks economic regulation due to poor logistics. This is a problem which is in the process of being fixed by implementing a clear and well-defined contract between the Water Agencies and the contractors who build the infrastructure.<ref name=":0" />

===England and Wales===
{{Main|Water privatisation in England and Wales}}
In England and Wales, water tariffs and profits increased substantially after privatization in 1989, but investments also increased and water quality in rivers improved.<ref name=Berg/> Tariffs increased by 46% in inflation-adjusted terms during the first nine years after privatization. Operating profits have more than doubled (+142%) in the first eight years. On the other hand, privatization increased investments: In the six years after privatization the companies invested £17 billion, compared to £9.3 billion in the six years before privatization.<ref name=Berg/> It also brought about compliance with stringent drinking water standards and led to a higher quality of river water.<ref name=Berg>[http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/115vdbrg.pdf Water privatization and regulation in England and Wales], by Caroline van den Berg 1997.</ref> According to data from [[OFWAT]], the economic regulator of water and sewer companies in England and Wales, from the early 1990s until 2010, network pressure has improved substantially, supply interruptions have become less frequent, the responsiveness to complaints has improved<ref name="OFWAT09">[[OFWAT]]:[http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/reporting/rpt_los_2009-10.pdf Service and delivery – performance of the water companies in England and Wales 2009–10], p. 21. Retrieved 16 June 2011.</ref> and leakage has been reduced.<ref>[[OFWAT]]:[http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/reporting/rpt_los_2009-10.pdf Service and delivery – performance of the water companies in England and Wales 2009–10], p. 40. Retrieved 16 June 2011.</ref>

In the 1980s the elite largely believed that the state was not building infrastructure for water in a manner that would allow the economy to grow appropriately. For this reason, the economic and political powerful spearhead a shift towards making water a privately owned utility.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Page|first1=Ben|last2=Bakker|first2=Karen|date=2005|title=Water governance and water users in a privatised water industry: participation in policy-making and in water services provision: a case study of England and Wales|journal=International Journal of Water|volume=3|issue=1|pages=38|doi=10.1504/ijw.2005.007158|issn=1465-6620}}</ref> Recently, the entire privatized water systems have been undergoing a complete restructuring. Small water companies in the UK have also been purchased by multinational companies from the United States, France and Scotland. The privately owned companies have been found to have trouble with water quality, environment pollution, sewage management, leakage and logistical errors.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Lobina, Emanuele.|title=UK water privatisation : a briefing|date=2001|publisher=Public Services International Research Unit|oclc=612915200}}</ref>

===Manila, the Philippines===
{{Main|Water privatization in the Philippines}}
[[File:Manila shanty.jpg|thumb|left|The private companies providing water in Manila have expanded access of water supply to the poor living in slums.]]
Water privatization in Manila began in 1997 with the award of two concession contracts for the Eastern and Western halves of [[Metro Manila]]. The concessions represent the largest population served by private operators in the developing world.<ref>[[World Bank]] / Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility:[http://www.ppiaf.org/ppiaf/sites/ppiaf.org/files/FINAL-PPPsforUrbanWaterUtilities-PhMarin.pdf Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in Developing Countries], by Philippe Marin, 2009, p. 114.</ref> As of 2010, the concession in Eastern Manila is highly successful and has led to significant improvements in access, service quality and efficiency: the population served more than doubled from 3 in 1997 to 6.1 million in 2009, the share of customers with continuous water supply increased from 26% to more than 98% and [[non-revenue water]] declined from 63% to 16%.<ref name="Rivera">Regulation and corporate innovation:The case of Manila Water, by Perry Rivera, in:Transforming the world of water, Global Water Summit 2010, Presented by Global Water Intelligence and the International Desalination Association.</ref> The concession in Western Manila failed when the company Maynilad went bankrupt in 2003. It was sold to new investors in 2007 and performance has improved since then.<ref>{{cite journal
| last = Wu
| first = Xun
|author2=Malaluan, Nepomuceno A.
| title = A Tale of Two Concessionaires: A Natural Experiment of Water Privatisation in Metro Manila
| journal = Urban Studies
| volume = 45
| issue = 1
| pages = 207–229, 212–217
| year = 2008
| doi = 10.1177/0042098007085108
| s2cid = 221015268
}}</ref> The share of the population with access to piped water in Western Manila increased from 67% in 1997 to 86% in 2006<ref name=Marin56>Philippe Marin:[http://wbwater.worldbank.org/water/publications/public-private-partnerships-urban-water-utilities-review-experiences-developing-countri Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities], World Bank, 2009, p. 56f.</ref> and the share of customers that enjoys 24-hour water supply increased from 32% in 2007 to 71% in early 2011.<ref>Maynilad:[http://www.mayniladwater.com.ph/news.php Maynilad doubles 24-hr service coverage under MPIC, DMCI], 18 January 2011.</ref>

===Argentina===
{{Main|Water privatization in Argentina}}

Water privatization in Argentina began in 1992 under the government of [[Carlos Menem]] as part of one of the world's largest privatization programs. Concessions were signed in 28% of the country's municipalities covering 60% of the population,<ref name="Galiani">{{cite web
|last = Galiani
|first = Sebastian
|author2 = Gertler, Paul
|author3 = Schargrodsky, Ernesto
|title = Water for Life: The Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality
|date = 31 August 2002
|url = http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubS-233.pdf
|page = 9
|access-date = 10 October 2013
|archive-date = 10 April 2008
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080410081428/http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubS-233.pdf
|url-status = dead
}}</ref> including in 1993 for [[Greater Buenos Aires|the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires]]. After the [[Argentine economic crisis (1999–2002)|2001 economic crisis]], under the government of [[Néstor Kirchner]], almost all concessions were terminated, including in Buenos Aires in 2006. The impact of the concession remains controversial. The government and critics argue that the concessionaire failed to achieve the targets set under the concession contract in terms of expansion of access, investment and service quality.<ref>A Loftus and DA McDonald. 2001. Of Liquid Dreams: A Political Ecology of Water Privatization in Buenos Aires, Environment and Urbanization, Volume 12, Number 2, pp. 179–200.</ref><ref>{{cite book
| last = Solanes
| first = Miguel
| title = Efficiency, Equity, and Liberalisation of Water Services in Buenos Aires, Argentina
| journal = Industry, Services & Trade
| volume = 2006
| issue = 22
| pages = 124–148
| publisher = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
| isbn = 978-92-64-02867-8
| year = 2006}}, p. 168.</ref> Proponents concede that targets were not reached, but argue that a freeze in tariffs at the time of the devaluation of the Peso during the Argentinian economic crisis in 2001 violated the contract and thus made it impossible to achieve the original targets. According to the Argentinian economist Sebastian Galiani, the public company OSN had invested only US$25m per year between 1983 and 1993, while the private concessionaire Aguas Argentinas increased investments to around US$200m per year between 1993 and 2000.<ref>{{cite web
|last = Galiani
|first = Sebastian
|author2 = Gertler, Paul
|author3 = Schargrodsky, Ernesto
|title = Water for Life: The Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality
|date = 31 August 2002
|url = http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubS-233.pdf
|page = 15
|access-date = 14 February 2008
|archive-date = 10 April 2008
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080410081428/http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubS-233.pdf
|url-status = dead
}}</ref> According to the private concessionnaire [[Suez (company, 2015)|Suez]], during the 13-year-duration of its concession it extended access to water to 2 million people and access to sanitation to 1 million people, despite the economic crisis.<ref>{{cite web
| last = Suez Environment
| title = Argentinian official website
| url = http://argentina.suez-environnement.com/en/nos-engegagements/agua-mas-trabajo/sustainable-solutions/sustainable-solutions/
| access-date =18 February 2008 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20071215225236/http://argentina.suez-environnement.com/en/nos-engegagements/agua-mas-trabajo/sustainable-solutions/sustainable-solutions/ |archive-date = 15 December 2007}}</ref><ref>Sarah Botton, Alexandre Braïlowsky and Sarah Matthieussent:[http://www.pseau.org/outils/ouvrages/botton_brailowsky_mathieussant_obstacles_en.pdf The real obstacles to universal access to the water service in developing countries:Thoughts stemming from the experience of access to drinking water of the poor neighbourhoods populations living in Port-au-Prince (Haiti) and Buenos Aires (Argentina)], May 2005, pp. 15-18, 31.</ref> In July 2010 the [[International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes]] (ICSID) ruled that the Argentinian government unfairly refused to allow the private concessionaires to raise tariffs during the period after the devaluation of the Argentine peso in 2001 and that the private companies are entitled to damages. The private companies announced that they would seek US$1.2bn in damages.<ref>Global Water Intelligence:[http://www.globalwaterintel.com/archive/11/8/general/suez-seeks-12bn-damages-argentina.html Suez seeks $1.2bn in damages in Argentina], Vol 11, Issue 8 (August 2010). Retrieved 17 October 2010.</ref>

===Cochabamba, Bolivia===
{{Main|Cochabamba Water War}}
[[File:Cochabamba panorama (cuadrado - square).jpg|thumb|left|[[Cochabamba]] was the scene of violent protests against water privatization in 2000.]]
In the mid-1990s the government of [[Bolivia]], under pressure from the [[World Bank]], decided to privatize water supply in the country's third largest city, [[Cochabamba]]. In the previous years, despite encumbered funds made available by the World Bank to support the public utility of Cochabamba, access to piped water in the city had decreased to 40%. Water losses had remained high at 40%, and water was supplied only 4 hours a day.<ref name="Tale of Three Cities">World Bank:[http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/docunidviewforjavasearch/ee95ee729b8a87cb85256bad0066c3a4/$file/precis_222.pdf Bolivia Water Management: A Tale of Three Cities], Operations Evaluation Department Précis, Spring 2002, Number 222. Retrieved 31 December 2010.</ref> Those not connected to the network paid ten times as much for their water to private vendors as those who were.<ref name="New Yorker">{{cite magazine|title=Leasing The Rain|first=William|last=Finnegan|date=8 April 2002|magazine=The New Yorker|url= http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/04/08/leasing-the-rain |access-date=29 June 2016}}</ref> This contrasted with the situation in Bolivia's second-largest city, [[Santa Cruz de la Sierra|Santa Cruz]], where a utility run as a cooperative had managed to increase access and improve service quality with the support of the World Bank. In Santa Cruz, privatization had never been considered.<ref name="Tale of Three Cities"/>

In 1997, a first bid for a water concession in Cochabamba had been declared void at the request of the mayor of Cochabamba, [[Manfred Reyes Villa]].<ref name="Tale of Three Cities"/> He wanted the construction of a large dam, the Misicuni dam, and a pipeline from the dam to the city to be included in the concession.<ref name="New Yorker"/> The World Bank had opposed the dam as unnecessarily expensive and subsequently ended its involvement related to water supply in the city.<ref name="Tale of Three Cities"/> Despite this, in the view of the public the World Bank remains inseparably linked to the Cochabamba privatization.

The government proceeded to bid out the concession; this time including the Misicuni dam. Only a single company submitted a bid, ''Aguas del Tunari'', a consortium led by [[Bechtel]].<ref name="Nash">{{cite book|title=Social Movements: An Anthropological Reader|first=June C.|last=Nash|publisher=Blackwell Publishing |location=United Kingdom|year=2002}}</ref> The government accepted the bid and signed the concession.<ref name="New Yorker"/><ref name="Nash"/> The consortium was guaranteed a minimum 15% annual return.<ref name="New Yorker"/> In parallel, a law was passed that appeared to give a monopoly to ''Aguas del Tunari'' over all water resources, including water used for irrigation, communal water systems and even rainwater collected on roofs.<ref name="Nash"/> Upon taking control the company raised water tariffs by 35%.

Demonstrations and a general strike erupted in January 2000 in protest against the tariff increase and the perceived privatization of water resources. The government arrested the leader of the protesters, [[Oscar Olivera]]. However, the protests spread to the entire country and the government declared a state of emergency in April. Protests still continued and several people were killed. In the midst of the turmoil the employees of ''Aguas del Tunari'' fled from Cochabamba.<ref name="New Yorker"/> The government finally released Oscar Olivera and signed an agreement with him stating that the concession would be ended.<ref name="Frontline">{{cite news|url= https://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bolivia/timeline.html|title=Timeline:Cochabamba Water Revolt|publisher=PBS|date=June 2002 |access-date=15 February 2007}}</ref> The government then told ''Aguas del Tunari'' that by leaving Cochabamba they had abandoned the concession and parliament revoked Law 2029. The Cochabamba protests became a worldwide symbol of struggle against [[neoliberalism]] and the Cochabamba privatization is probably, both among activists against [[globalization]] and the general public, by far the best known example of the failure of water privatization.

The company, insisting that it had been forced out, filed a $25 million lawsuit in the [[International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes]].<ref name="New Yorker"/> The proceedings, which were held behind closed doors, ended in 2006 with a settlement under which Bechtel dropped its claim.<ref>Opinio Juris:[http://lawofnations.blogspot.com/2006/02/bechtel-abandons-its-icsid-claim.html Bechtel Abandons its ICSID Claim Against Bolivia], 10 February 2006. Retrieved 11 June 2011.</ref> With financing from the [[Inter-American Development Bank]] the city expanded its piped water system in the aftermath of the riots.<ref>[[Inter-American Development Bank]]:[http://www.bnamericas.com/news/waterandwaste/IDB_maintains_US*18,6mn_for_Cochabamba_waterworks IDB maintains US$18.6mn for Cochabamba waterworks], 24 June 2002.</ref> Nevertheless, under public management half of the 600,000 people of Cochabamba remain without piped water and those with it continue to receive intermittent service. [[Oscar Olivera]] the leading figure in the protests admitted, "I would have to say we were not ready to build new alternatives."<ref name="Times Water">{{cite news|title= Bolivia regrets IMF experiment | first=Juan| last=Forero|work=The New York Times|date=14 December 2005|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/14/business/worldbusiness/bolivia-regrets-imf-experiment.html |access-date=29 June 2016}}</ref>

===Colombia===
{{Main|Water privatization in Colombia}}
[[File:Bocagrande Cartagena.JPG|thumb|left|[[Cartagena, Colombia|Cartagena]] is one of the Colombian cities whose water supply is provided by a mixed public-private company.]]
Between 1996 and 2007, public-private partnerships for water and sewer services in more than 40 Colombian cities were entered into, serving more than 20% of the country's urban population. Most of the contracts were awarded in municipalities with highly deteriorated infrastructure, such as [[Barranquilla]] and [[Cartagena, Colombia|Cartagena]]. The central government financed most investments through grants, thus reducing the need to increase tariffs. Water privatization in Colombia was largely homegrown, adapting models used elsewhere to the particular circumstances and culture of Colombia.<ref>{{cite web
| last = World Bank
| author-link = World Bank
| title = Local Solutions Improve Water Supply and Sanitation Services in Colombia
| year = 2006
| url = http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWSS/Resources/colombia.pdf
| access-date =2 March 2008}}</ref> A model introduced from Spain, the mixed company with a majority stake by the municipality and a minority stake by a private operator, was particularly successful. Foreign water companies won some of the early contracts, but quickly sold a majority of their shares to Colombian operators. There was a significant increase in access under private contracts. For example, in Cartagena, water supply coverage increased from 74 percent to almost universal coverage, while sewer coverage went up from 62 percent to 79 percent between 1996 and 2006. Half a million people gained access and 60 percent of the new connections benefited families in the poorest income quintile. To achieve universal coverage, the operator made extensive use of community bulk-supply schemes that provide safe water to the many illegal settlements that were expanding on the city's periphery. However, there is no conclusive evidence showing that access increased more rapidly under private contracts than in the case of publicly managed utilities. In Cartagena, tariffs declined substantially, indicating that the operator passed on efficiency gains to consumers.<ref name="Gomes-Lobo">Gomes-Lobo, Andrés, and M. Melendez: Social Policy, Regulation and Private Sector Participation: the Case of Colombia. [[United Nations Research Institute for Social Development]] (UNRISD) Working Paper, April 2007, Geneva.</ref><ref>[[World Bank]] / Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility:[http://www.ppiaf.org/ppiaf/sites/ppiaf.org/files/FINAL-PPPsforUrbanWaterUtilities-PhMarin.pdf Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in Developing Countries], by Philippe Marin, 2009, pp. 37-38, 43, 60.</ref><ref>{{cite web
| last = Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
| author-link = Inter-American Development Bank
| title = When a water meter is worth more than a house
| year = 2006
| url = http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?thisid=3917
| access-date = 2 March 2008
| archive-date = 29 September 2007
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070929083544/http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?thisid=3917
| url-status = dead
}}</ref>

===Cuba===

In January 2000 when the socialist government of [[Cuba]] created a mixed public-private company to manage the water, sewer and stormwater drainage system in 8 of the 15 municipalities that make up the country's capital [[Havana]]. The government avoids the term privatization, despite the involvement of two foreign private companies as key partners in the mixed company. The company operates under a 25-year renewable concession contract. It serves 1.25 million inhabitants in the municipalities of Old Havana, Central Havana, Cerro, Plaza de la Revolución, 10 Octubre, La Lisa, Playa, and Marianao, which together are home to 60 percent of Havana's population. The company, called '''Aguas de la Habana''', has a capital of 8 million USD and is owned by the Cuban state through the National Institute for Water Resources (INRH), the Spanish private company [[Aguas de Barcelona]] (Agbar) and the Spanish family firm Grupo Martinon. The contract foresees that ultimately the entire population of Havana will be served by the company.<ref name=AdlH/>

The cooperation between the three companies goes back to a project undertaken in the Cuban tourist resort [[Varadero]] since 1994, involving Canaragua, the subsidiary of Aguas de Barcelona operating in the Canary Islands, and the firm Martinon whose owners also come from the Canary Islands. After this successful initial experience, Agbar and INRH signed a contract to operate the water services in three municipalities La Lisa, Playa and Marianao in Western Havana in 1997. Following this pilot project, the creation of the mixed company Aguas de la Habana was decided in a framework agreement signed in February 1999 in Barcelona.<ref name=AdlH/>

Agbar "facilitated" 24.7 million USD of financing through loans.<ref name=AdlH>{{cite web|last=Aguas de la Habana|title=Nuestra empresa|url=http://www.ahabana.co.cu/|accessdate=27 December 2011}}</ref> <ref>{{cite web|last=Grupo Martinon|title=Aguas de La Habana|url=http://www.grupomartinon.com/index.php/es/activos/aguas-de-la-habana|accessdate=27 December 2011}}</ref> At least some of these loans are soft loans from the Spanish International Cooperation Agency, which financed the first ever major rehabilitation of the more than one century old Albear aqueduct that provides 12% of the capital's water supply.<ref>{{cite web|last=Aguas de Habana|title=Acueductos de la Ciudad|url=http://www.ahabana.co.cu/legado-historia.php|accessdate=27 December 2011}}</ref> In addition to operating and maintaining the systems, Aguas de La Habana also carries out engineering studies and executes works.

The company's annual billing is US$ 9m for about 115 million cubic meters of water it delivers to its customers.<ref>[http://www.finanzas.com/id.3963754/noticias/noticia.htm Agbar] (Link broken)</ref> As of 2004, Aguas de Barcelona reported significant progress. According to the company, 95 percent of the city's residents that had to be supplied by tanker trucks before the concession contract relied on tap water as of 2004. The continuity of supply had increased from 7 to 10 hours per day.<ref>{{cite web|last=Fernando Rayón Martín Xavier Segura Ayala|title=LA GESTIÓN PRIVADA DEL AGUA EN ESPAÑA Y AMÉRICA LATINA: EL CASO DE AGBAR.|url=https://congreso.us.es/ciberico/archivos_word/FernandoRayon.doc|publisher=Sector Agua y Saneamiento del Grupo Agbar|accessdate=16 February 2014|date=2004}}</ref> However, as of 2010 progress was apparently slow, as water distribution losses are still estimated at 50% in 2010 and more than 100,000 inhabitants suffer from intermittent supply.<ref>El Mundo:[http://www.elmundo.es/america/2010/01/23/cuba/1264265558.html La Habana y sus aguas perdidas](Havanna and its lost waters), 26 January 2010</ref>


==Impact of privatization==
The evidence concerning the impact of water privatization is mixed. Often proponents and opponents of water privatization emphasize those examples, studies, methods and indicators that support their respective point of view. As with any empirical study, results are influenced by the methods used. For example, some studies simply compare the situation before privatization to the situation after privatization. More sophisticated studies try to compare the changes in privately managed utilities to those of publicly managed utilities that operate under similar conditions during the same period. The second group of studies often use [[econometrics|econometric]] techniques. The results also depend on the choice of the indicator used to measure impact: One common indicator is the increase in access to water supply and sewerage. Other indicators are changes in tariffs, investments, water-borne diseases or indicators for service quality (e.g. continuity of supply or drinking water quality) and efficiency (e.g. water losses or labor productivity).

===Impact on access===
When it comes to impact on access to safe and clean water, it is inevitable to bring up public-private partnerships and tariff into spotlight, as they are one of the main factors determining one's ability to access water. A before after comparative study by [[World Bank]] analyzes how access, quality of service, operational efficiency and tariffs have evolved under 65 public-private partnerships for urban water utilities in developing countries. The study estimates that "PPP projects have provided access to piped water for more than 24 million people in developing countries since 1990".<ref name=":03">{{Cite book|last=Marin|first=Philippe|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=D7YsorFRVLkC&q=%22PPP+projects+have+provided+access+to+piped+water+for+more+than+24+million+people+in+developing+countries+since+1990%22.&pg=PA3|title=Public Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in Developing Countries|date=2009-09-22|publisher=World Bank Publications|isbn=978-0-8213-7957-8|language=en}}</ref> Therefore, PPP had been a key significant in helping improved service quality of access to water.<ref name=":03" />

Apart from PPP, tariffs are also another important factor that directly impact one's access to safe and clean water. In some countries, water privatization can hinder the accessibility of water. When for-profit companies invest in the water system, the desire to make returns on the investment can create a top-heavy distribution system. They increase tariffs to earn more profits, which consequently reduces the accessibility of the resource for poor households since the poor are not able to pay high tariffs.<ref>{{cite book|last=Labonte|first=Ronald|title=Fatal indifference: the G8, Africa and global health|publisher=IDRC|year=2004}}</ref> In other words, investments are only made to improve accessibility in richer districts where the people can pay the tariffs. In this manner, the water company's need to make adequate returns is met by supplying water only to those who can pay.<ref>Salina, Irena, dir. Flow. Prod. Steven Starr. Oscilloscope, 2008. Film. 20 May 2013.</ref> However, in other countries such as Nigeria and Ghana where the governments fail to distribute access to water to the people, water privatization led to expansion of services to low-income districts.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Item Details Page for From curiosity to commodity: a review of the evolution of sachet drinking water in West Africa|url=https://soka.on.worldcat.org/oclc/7013387336|access-date=2020-11-21|website=soka.on.worldcat.org}}</ref>

===Impact on health===
One of the most effective measurement to analyze the effectiveness of water privatization is [[Child mortality|child mortality rate]] since children are more likely to be negatively affected by contaminated waters.<ref name=":1">{{cite web|last=Galiani|first=Sebastian|author2=Gertler, Paul|author3=Schargrodsky, Ernesto|date=31 August 2002|title=Water for Life: The Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality|url=http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubS-233.pdf|access-date=14 February 2008|page=1|archive-date=10 April 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080410081428/http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubS-233.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> Water privatization has historically had mixed impacts on child mortality and the overall health of the people affected by it. A study of water privatization's impact on health finds that, between 1991 and 1997 in Argentina, areas where child mortality was upwards of 26% fell to just under 8% after water was privatized.<ref name=":1" /> This occurred due to the regulations private water companies were held to which were more rigorous than their government-controlled counterparts. Along with this, development of water infrastructure in impoverished areas at the hands of private companies also positively affected child mortality rates. Governments are prone to privatize water companies, among other reasons, to better the quality of the water provided to the country's citizens.

In Argentina, water privatization did not fulfill many promises the citizens were expecting. This includes the expansion of sewerage treatment and connections and the reduction of the price of water, which actually increased. Along with this, the private water companies in Argentina needed help from the Argentine government to bypass regulatory agencies after it treated to cancel their contract due to conflicts of interest. It is also worth noting that many worker unions were opposed to privatizing water but their pleads were largely ignored by the Argentine government.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Loftus|first=A. J|date=2001-10-01|title=Of liquid dreams: a political ecology of water privatization in Buenos Aires|journal=Environment and Urbanization|volume=13|issue=2|pages=179–199|doi=10.1177/095624780101300215|s2cid=153477386|issn=0956-2478}}</ref>

The impact of water privatization on the amount of carcinogenic found in water is highly debated. In some cases, such as the case in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany, public water systems are likely to invest more money into making water quality good. Water companies working on a commercial basis might find it too costly to implement systems to better the water quality beyond what is necessary by law. Thus, posing a greater threat of containing harmful cancer-causing substances in the water.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Wilhelm|first1=Michael|last2=Bergmann|first2=Sabine|last3=Dieter|first3=Hermann H.|date=June 2010|title=Occurrence of perfluorinated compounds (PFCs) in drinking water of North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany and new approach to assess drinking water contamination by shorter-chained C4–C7 PFCs|journal=International Journal of Hygiene and Environmental Health|volume=213|issue=3|pages=224–232|doi=10.1016/j.ijheh.2010.05.004|pmid=20556880|issn=1438-4639}}</ref>

===Impact on tariffs===
Although the impact on tariffs cannot be fully concluded since each country has different policy on tariffs, water tariffs tend to be increased under privatization. For instance, in Buenos Aires and in Manila, tariffs first declined, but then increased above their initial level; in Cochabamba or in Guyana, tariffs were increased at the time of privatization. However, there are some other cases that tariffs under water privatization did not increase in a long run, typically in Sub-Saharan Africa, where most of investments are funded through development aid. For example, tariffs remained stable in Senegal, while in Gabon they declined by 50% in five years (2001–2006) and by 30% in ten years in Côte d'Ivoire (1990 to 2000).<ref>[[World Bank]] / Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility: [http://www.ppiaf.org/ppiaf/sites/ppiaf.org/files/FINAL-PPPsforUrbanWaterUtilities-PhMarin.pdf Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in Developing Countries], by Philippe Marin, 2009, pp. 107-116.</ref>

In addition, initial tariffs have been well below [[Expense and cost recovery system|cost recovery]] levels in almost all cases, sometimes covering only a fraction of the cost of service provision. The magnitude of tariff increases is influenced by the profit margin of private operators, but also to a large extent by the efficiency of utilities in terms of water losses and labor productivity.

However, comparing water expenditure between private and public management in the U.S., a study of household water expenditures in cities under private and public management in the U.S. concludes that "whether water systems are owned by private firms or governments may, on average, simply not matter much."<ref name="Wallsten 2005">Wallsten, Scott and Katrina Kosec:[https://ssrn.com/abstract=707131 "Public or Private Drinking Water? The Effects of Ownership and Benchmark Competition on U.S. Water System Regulatory Compliance and Household Water Expenditures"], [[Brookings Institution]] Working Paper 05-05. (March 2005).</ref>

===Impact on efficiency===
According to a World Bank study in 2005, the most consistent improvement made by public-private partnerships in water supply was in [[operational efficiency]]. The study reviews the impact of private management on the efficiency of water utilities in many countries from many continents including Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe. Most evidences from the study suggests that "there is no statistically significant difference between the efficiency performance of public and private operators in this sector.".<ref name="Estache2">Antonio Estache(World Bank and ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles), Sergio Perelman (CREPP, Université de Liège), Lourdes Trujillo (DAEA, Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria): [http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2005/03/06/000090341_20050306101429/Rendered/PDF/wps3514.pdf World Bank Infrastructure Performance and Reform in Developing and Transition Economies: Evidence from a Survey of Productivity Measures], World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3514, February 2005, pp. 11-13.</ref> In addition, a 2008 literature review by the Asian Development Bank shows that of 20 studies reviewed, only three show concrete evidence on technical efficiency improvements or cost reductions under private management.<ref name="Gunatilake2">Gunatilake, Herath and Mary Jane F. Carangal–San Jose: [http://www.adb.org/Documents/ERD/Working_Papers/Wp115.pdf Privatization Revisited: Lessons from Private Sector Participation in Water Supply and Sanitation in Developing Countries], [[Asian Development Bank]], ERD Working Paper No. 115, 2008, p. 13.</ref> Therefore, by 2005, private operator, at least, made an indirect contribution to financing by improving efficiency, making it possible for utilities to finance investments internally instead of having to rely on more debt.<ref name="ppiaf.org2" />

===Profitability===
An empirical study of 34 concessions in nine Latin American countries during the 1990s, including 10 water concessions in 5 countries (3 in Argentina, 1 in Bolivia, 1 in Brazil, 3 in Chile and 2 in Colombia), has estimated the profitability of concessions compared to the cost of capital of private companies. According to the study, contrary to public perception, the financial returns of private infrastructure concessions have been modest. The average annual return on capital employed was 7 percent. For a number of concessions, the returns have been below the cost of capital. On average telecommunications and energy concessions have fared much better than water concessions. Seven out of 10 water concessions had negative rates of return and two concessions had returns that were lower than the cost of capital of the private companies.<ref>Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility / World Bank:[http://www.ppiaf.org/ppiaf/sites/ppiaf.org/files/publication/Trends%20Policy%20Options-2-Infrastructure%20Concessions%20in%20LAC%20SSirtaine%20et%20al.pdf How Profitable Are Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America? Empirical Evidence and Regulatory Implications], January 2005, by Sophie Sirtaine, Maria Elena Pinglo, J. Luis Guasch and Vivien Foster.</ref>

==Private water operators==
Private water operators come in very different forms from multinational corporations to small enterprises. According to the [[Pinsent Masons]] Water Yearbook 2010–11, 909 million people (13% of the world population) were served by private operators. The largest private water companies are:

* the French firm [[Veolia Environnement]] ([[Vivendi]]), serving 125.4 million in 2011;
* the French firm [[Suez (company, 2015)|Suez]], serving 124.3 million people in 2011 with its US subsidiary [[United Water]] and its Spanish subsidiary [[Aguas de Barcelona]];
* the Spanish firm [[Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas|Fomento de Construcciones Y Contratas SA]] (FCC), serving 28.2 million people in 2011;
* the German firm [[RWE]], serving 18.3 million people in 2011;
* the Italian firm ACEA, serving 18 million people in 2011;
* the British firm [[Thames Water]], indirectly owned by [[Macquarie Group]], an Australian investment bank;
* the French firm [[SAUR]], serving 12.4 million in 2011; and
* the US firm [[American Water (company)|American Water]], serving 16.8 million in 2011.

Domestic water operators have a strong presence in Brazil, Colombia, China, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Public water companies also sometimes participate in bids for private water contracts. For example, the Moroccan state-owned water utility ONEP has won a bid in Cameroon<ref>Business Cameroon: [http://www.businessincameroon.com/categories/53-news/221-drinking-water-the-partnership-onep-camwater Drinking water: the partnership ONEP-CAMWATER], 13 August 2010.</ref> and the Dutch publicly owned water firm Vitens has won a management contract in [[Water supply and sanitation in Ghana|Ghana]].

==See also==
{{div col}}
*[[Resource consumption|Water consumption]]
*[[Remunicipalization]]
*[[Bottled water]]
*[[Nestlé Waters]]
Countries and cities with private sector participation in water supply as of 2013:
*[[Water privatization in Algeria]]
*[[Water privatization in Armenia]]
*[[Water privatization in Brazil]]
*[[Water privatization in Bucharest]]
*[[Water privatization in Chile]]
*[[Water privatization in Colombia]]
*[[Water privatization in Cuba]]
*[[Water privatization in Ecuador]]
*[[Water privatisation in England]]
*[[Water privatization in Honduras]]
*[[Water privatization in Jakarta]]
*[[Water privatization in Metro Manila]]
*[[Water privatization in Morocco]]
*[[Water privatization in South Africa]]
*[[Water privatization in the United States]]

Countries which had private sector participation in water supply in the past:
*[[Water privatization in Albania]]
*[[Water privatization in Argentina]]
*[[Water privatization in Bolivia]]
*[[Water privatization in Ghana]]
*[[Water privatization in Guinea]]
*[[Water privatization in Tanzania]]
{{div col end}}

==References==
{{reflist}}

==Further reading==
* Balanyá, Belén, Brid Brennan, Olivier Hoedeman, Satoko Kishimoto and Philipp Terhorst (eds): [http://www.tni.org/books/publicwater.pdf ''Reclaiming Public Water: Achievements, Struggles and Visions from Around the World''], [[Transnational Institute]] and [[Corporate Europe Observatory]], January 2005. {{ISBN|90-71007-10-3}}.
* Schiffler, Manuel: Water, Politics and Money. A Reality Check on Privatization, Springer International Publishing, 2015. {{ISBN|978-3-319-16690-2}}.
* Segerfeldt, Fredrik:[http://www.stockholm-network.org/downloads/events/d41d8cd9-Amigo%20Segerfeldt.pdf Water for sale: how business and the market can resolve the world's water crisis], Presentation at the Amigo Society, Brussels, 30 May 2006.
* Sjölander Holland, Ann-Christin:''The Water Business: Corporations versus People'', Zed Books, 2005, {{ISBN|1-84277-564-2}}.
* Kleemeier, Elizabeth L. [http://water.worldbank.org/water/publications/private-operators-and-rural-water-supplies-desk-review-experience/ Private Operators and Rural Water Supplies : A Desk Review of Experience] The World Bank, Nov. 2010.
* Marin, Philippe [http://water.worldbank.org/water/publications/public-private-partnerships-urban-water-utilities-review-experiences-developing-countri/ Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in Developing Countries] The World Bank, Feb. 2009, {{ISBN|978-0-8213-7956-1}}.

==External links==
{{Wiktionary|publification}}
* [http://water.worldbank.org/water/ The World Bank's work and publications on water resources]

;Multimedia
*''[[Flow: For Love of Water]]'', a 2008 documentary film

{{Natural resources}}
{{Portal bar|Water|Companies|Law}}

[[Category:Water privatization| ]]
[[Category:Privatization controversies]]
[[Category:Water]]
[[Category:Water and politics]]



== References ==
== References ==
<references group="" responsive="1"></references>
<references group="" responsive="1"></references>

Revisão das 00h31min de 15 de abril de 2023

A privatização da água é a abertura de participações do setor privado no abastecimento de água e saneamento básico.

Essa prática possui uma história prolongada, marcada por variações de popularidade e favorabilidade no mercado e na política. Uma das formas mais usuais de privatização é a parceria público-privada (PPPs).[1] As PPPs permitem uma mistura entre propriedade pública e privada e/ou gestão de fontes e infra-estruturas de água e saneamento. A privatização, como defendem os proponentes, pode não só aumentar a eficiência e a qualidade do serviço, mas também aumentar os benefícios fiscais. Há diferentes formas de regulação em vigor para os atuais sistemas de privatização.

A participação do setor privado no abastecimento de água e saneamento é controversa. Os defensores da participação do setor privado argumentam que esta conduziu a melhorias na eficiência e qualidade de serviço dos serviços de utilidade pública. Argumenta-se que tem aumentado o investimento e contribuído para a expansão do acesso. Citam Manila, Guayaquil no Equador, Bucareste, várias cidades na Colômbia e Marrocos, bem como a Costa do Marfim e o Senegal como histórias de sucesso.[2][3][4]

Os críticos, contudo, argumentam que a participação do sector privado levou a aumentos tarifários, e os sistemas de água privatizados são incompatíveis com a garantia do direito humano internacional à água, com a crença de que a água pública deixará de ser pública. As privatizações abortadas em Cochabamba, Bolívia, e Dar es-Salaam, Tanzânia, bem como os sistemas de água geridos pelo setor privado em Jacarta e Berlim, são destacados como fracassos. Descata-se o exemplo da Áustria que proibiu no ano de 2019, a privatização do abastecimento de água em sua constituição.[5][6][7][8][9][10][11]

Números delineando a acessibilidade da água do setor privado também mostram a controvérsia das fontes privadas de água: uma fonte afirma que 909 milhões de pessoas foram atendidas por "atores privados" em 2011 globalmente, acima dos 681 milhões de pessoas em 2007. Este número inclui pessoas atendidas por empresas públicas que apenas terceirizaram o financiamento, construção e operação de parte de seus ativos, tais como água ou estações de tratamento de esgoto, para o setor privado.[12]

O Banco Mundial estimou que a população urbana atendida diretamente por operadores privados de água nos países em desenvolvimento era muito menor, em 170 milhões de pessoas em 2007. Entre eles, apenas cerca de 15 milhões de pessoas, todas vivendo no Chile, são servidas por empresas privadas de serviços públicos. Empresas privadas, mas de propriedade pública, atendem o restante sob contratos de concessão, arrendamento e gestão.

História

Hampton Waterworks em Londres fizeram parte dos ativos vendidos em 1989 como parte da privatização do abastecimento de água na Inglaterra

As concessionárias privadas de água eram comuns na Europa, Estados Unidos e América Latina em meados e fins do século XIX. Sua importância foi se desvanecendo gradualmente até o início do século 20, pois se mostraram incapazes de expandir o acesso e as concessionárias públicas se tornaram mais fortes. Um segundo alvorecer global das concessionárias privadas de água veio no início dos anos 90, após as privatizações de Thatcher na Inglaterra e no País de Gales, a queda do comunismo e a consequente ênfase global nas políticas de mercado livre.[13] O Banco Mundial e o Fundo Monetário Internacional desempenharam um papel importante neste processo através da condicionalidade de seus empréstimos. Na Inglaterra e no País de Gales, o surgimento das primeiras empresas privadas de água remonta ao século XVII. Em 1820, seis empresas privadas de água operavam em Londres. Entretanto, a participação de mercado das empresas privadas de água em Londres diminuiu de 40% em 1860 para 10% em 1900. Na década de 1980, sua participação em toda a Inglaterra e País de Gales era de cerca de 25%.[14] A maré mudou completamente em 1989, quando o governo conservador de Margaret Thatcher privatizou todas as empresas de água e esgoto na Inglaterra e no País de Gales, entretanto na Escócia, o Partido Trabalhista em poder, manteve os sistemas de água em mãos públicas.

O abastecimento de água de Paris foi operado por duas empresas privadas de 1985 a 2010, cada uma servindo a metade da cidade.

Na França sempre foi caracterizado por uma coexistência de gestão pública e privada, com suas respectivas ações flutuando ao longo do tempo. As duas maiores empresas privadas são a Veolia Environnement, e a Suez Environnement. No final do século XIX, os governos municipais, insatisfeitos com as altas tarifas e a falta de expansão das redes para bairros pobres, não renovaram as concessões privadas e criaram, em vez disso, concessionárias municipais. A participação das operadoras privadas de água caiu para 17% em 1936. A participação do setor privado aumentou gradualmente para 32% em 1954, 50% em 1975, e 80% em 2000, utilizando um novo modelo.

Em vez dos contratos de concessão, que davam a responsabilidade de financiar investimentos à empresa privada, os novos contratos de arrendamento (affermages) tornaram o operador privado responsável apenas pela operação e manutenção, enquanto que os grandes investimentos passaram a ser de responsabilidade dos municípios. As empresas francesas de água também escaparam das nacionalizações após a guerra e mais tarde sob o Presidente François Mitterrand, porque o governo central não queria interferir na autonomia dos municípios e não estava disposto a financiar investimentos pesados. O abastecimento de água de Paris foi privatizado em 1985, quando um prefeito conservador concedeu dois contratos de arrendamento, cada um cobrindo metade da cidade. Em 2010, um prefeito socialista remunerou o sistema de abastecimento de água da capital francesa.

O abastecimento de água de Barcelona é administrado por uma empresa privada, a Aguas de Barcelona, desde 1867.

Enquanto isso, o setor de água na Espanha, as empresas privadas de água mantiveram sua posição, iniciando a tendência global no final do século XIX e início do século XX. A maior empresa privada de água da Espanha é a Águas de Barcelona. Inicialmente criada por investidores franceses e belgas, foi vendida a investidores espanhóis em 1920, apenas para voltar gradualmente ao controle francês no início do século 21.

Na Alemanha, uma empresa privada britânica de água tinha instalado o primeiro sistema de água encanada e estação de tratamento em Berlim em 1852, mas a cidade, insatisfeita com a falta de investimento em particular em esgoto, cancelou o contrato em 1873.[15] Em 1887 foi criada a Gelsenwasser AG, que continua sendo um importante fornecedor regional de água no distrito do Ruhr. O setor hídrico alemão sempre foi dominado por empresas municipais. Apesar disso, o sistema de água de Berlim foi parcialmente privatizado em 1999 por razões fiscais.[16]

Nos Estados Unidos, 60% dos sistemas de água encanada eram de propriedade privada em 1850. No entanto, esta participação caiu para 30% em 1924. A partir de 2010, 2000 instalações de água e esgoto nos Estados Unidos foram operadas sob parcerias público-privadas, um esforço conjunto entre o grupo privado e o município em que estava operando.[17]

No Chile, a ditadura de Pinochet estabeleceu a Constituição de 1980, incluindo as leis da água, que é a base dos sistemas hídricos do Chile. Além disso, o governo promulgou o Código da Água de 1981, um regime legal que decide eliminar o envolvimento do governo no controle do sistema hídrico e permitir que os cidadãos possuam direitos de exploração dos recursos hídricos. Ao estabelecer este Código de Águas, o governo do Chile conseguiu a privatização da água, e este regime ainda está em vigor. Hoje, o governo reduziu seu poder na administração dos recursos hídricos; portanto, 90% do abastecimento de água potável do Chile é controlado pelas corporações transnacionais. Entretanto, este sistema de água causa o desequilíbrio da distribuição dos direitos de água no Chile. Por exemplo, como o Código da Água permite que as empresas explorem os recursos hídricos, 71% dos recursos hídricos do Chile são utilizados na irrigação, o que equivale ao consumo anual de 243 milhões de lares.[18] A distribuição desigual dos direitos da água induz à escassez dos recursos hídricos dos cidadãos chilenos, particularmente na seca.

Jonannesburg against Water Privatization
Manifestação em Joanesburgo, contra a privatização da água, dezembro de 2008

Empresas privadas de água européias e locais expandiram-se na América Latina, África e Ásia na segunda metade do século XIX, enquanto sua importância diminuiu na Europa. No Uruguai, o abastecimento de água foi administrado privadamente de 1867 a 1950; em Buenos Aires, Argentina, por um breve período de 1887 a 1891 e novamente de 1993 a 2006; no Cairo e Alexandria, Egito, de 1867 a 1956; em Beirute, Líbano, do século XIX até 1951; em Xangai, China, de 1875 a 1949; em Casablanca, Marrocos, de 1914 a 1962 e novamente após 1997; no Senegal até 1971 e novamente após 1996; e na Costa do Marfim desde a época colonial até hoje sem interrupção.[19]

Na Europa Central e Oriental, após a queda do comunismo, as empresas privadas expandiram-se durante o final dos anos 1990, especialmente na Bulgária, Chéquia, Hungria e Romênia.

No entanto, algumas privatizações da água fracassaram, principalmente em 2000 em Cochabamba, Bolívia, abrindo caminho para um novo pragmatismo e uma ênfase reduzida na privatização, e em 2019, a Áustria proibiu a privatização do fornecimento de água através de sua constituição.

Formas de privatizatição

Em termos gerais, há duas formas de participação do setor privado no abastecimento de água e saneamento. Em uma privatização total, os ativos são permanentemente vendidos a um investidor privado. Em uma parceria público-privada, a propriedade dos ativos permanece pública e apenas certas funções são delegadas a uma empresa privada por um período específico. A privatização total do abastecimento de água e saneamento é hoje uma exceção, estando limitada à Inglaterra, Chile e algumas cidades dos Estados Unidos. As parcerias público-privadas (PPPs) são a forma mais comum de participação do setor privado no abastecimento de água e saneamento atualmente.

As três formas mais comuns de PPPs, na ordem de responsabilidades crescentes para o parceiro privado, são:

  • Concessão, sob a qual o operador privado é responsável pelo funcionamento de todo o sistema. O investimento é financiado em sua maioria ou integralmente e realizado pelo operador privado. A duração é normalmente de 20-30 anos.
  • Contrato de gestão, sob o qual o operador privado é responsável apenas pelo funcionamento do sistema, em troca de uma taxa que, em certa medida, está relacionada ao desempenho. O investimento é financiado e realizado pelo setor público. A duração é normalmente de 4-7 anos.
  • Contrato de arrendamento, sob o qual os ativos são arrendados ao operador privado que recebe uma parte das receitas. Assim, normalmente, ele suporta um risco comercial maior do que sob um contrato de administração. O investimento é total ou majoritariamente financiado e realizado pelo setor público. A duração é tipicamente de 10-15 anos.
  • Empresa de economia mista na qual um investidor privado assume uma participação minoritária em uma empresa de água com total responsabilidade gerencial investida no parceiro privado.

As concessões são a forma mais comum de PPPs em abastecimento de água e saneamento. Elas são seguidas por arrendamentos, também chamados affermages, mais comumente usados na França e na África Ocidental francófona. Os contratos de gestão são utilizados na Arábia Saudita, Argélia e Armênia, entre outros. As empresas de propriedade mista são mais comuns na Espanha, Colômbia e México.

Uma concessão para a construção de uma nova fábrica é chamada de contrato de Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT). Sob um contrato BOT, o operador privado assina um acordo com uma concessionária que compra serviços de tratamento de água ou de tratamento de esgoto.

Motivos para a Privatização

Os motivos para a privatização da água variam de um caso para outro, e muitas vezes determinam qual o modo de privatização escolhido: os contratos de gestão e locação são usados para aumentar a eficiência e melhorar a qualidade do serviço, enquanto as vendas de ativos e concessões visam principalmente reduzir a carga financeira ou expandir o acesso. Motivos ideológicos e influências externas também desempenham um papel, com a ideologia liberal de mercado favorecendo a privatização, ideologias de esquerda se opõem, e tanto conservadores como centristas se situam no meio, muitas vezes baseados em considerações locais e comerciais. Normalmente, vários dos motivos acima são combinados.

Incremento da eficiência e melhoria da qualidade do serviço

A privatização da água é vista por alguns como uma solução para melhorar os sistemas públicos de abastecimento de água mal administrados. Os sintomas de má administração podem incluir baixa cobrança de contas de água, altas perdas de água (conhecidas como água sem receita) e fornecimento intermitente de água, às vezes durando apenas algumas horas por dia ou alguns dias por semana. Na Argélia, Arábia Saudita, Colômbia e Cuba, aumentar a eficiência e melhorar a qualidade do serviço foram os principais motivos para a privatização da água. Nesses casos, o argumento para privatizar a água é baseado na crença de que, adotando uma abordagem baseada no mercado para a gestão da água, o prestador de serviços será incentivado pelo lucro para aumentar a eficiência e melhorar a qualidade do serviço.[20]

Alguns críticos argumentam que esta crença é mal orientada porque o setor de abastecimento de água é tipicamente monopolizado por uma empresa privada. Eles alegam que isso contraria muitas das vantagens associadas à economia de mercado, porque sem concorrência entre múltiplas empresas de serviços de água não há nada que faça baixar os preços e aumentar os níveis de eficiência.[20]

Influências Externas

Influências externas, como as do Banco Mundial e do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), muitas vezes desempenham um papel na decisão dos governos de privatizar a água, como foi o caso na Bolívia e em vários países africanos. Esta influência pode tomar a forma de programas de ajuste estrutural, nos quais um empréstimo para o desenvolvimento é concedido na condição de que o país receptor privatize seu sistema de abastecimento de água.[20] Outras agências de ajuda também têm apoiado a privatização da água.

Estas incluem o Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento (por exemplo, no Equador, Colômbia e Honduras), o Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento (por exemplo, na China), o Banco Europeu de Reconstrução e Desenvolvimento na Europa Oriental, a cooperação alemã para o desenvolvimento através do KfW (por exemplo, na Albânia, Armênia, Jordânia e Peru), a cooperação francesa para o desenvolvimento (por exemplo, no Senegal) e a cooperação britânica para o desenvolvimento (por exemplo, na Tanzânia e na Guiana).

Os críticos afirmam que essas influências externas são problemáticas e argumentam que influenciar a privatização da água é parte de um movimento mais amplo das potências ocidentais impondo o neoliberalismo aos países do Sul Global.[20]

Razões Financeiras

Em alguns casos, onde o acesso já é universal e a qualidade do serviço é boa, os motivos financeiros dominam, como foi o caso em Berlim, Alemanha e no Chile. Em Berlim, o governo estadual vendeu em 1999 uma participação de 49,9% de sua concessionária de água por 1,69 bilhões de euros em troca de um lucro garantido para os acionistas privados equivalente à taxa de juros sobre títulos do governo a 10 anos mais 2%, como especificado em um contrato que foi mantido confidencial até que o governo estadual fosse forçado por um referendo a torná-lo público.

Como resultado, as tarifas aumentaram (15% só em 2004) e as receitas do governo estadual da empresa diminuíram em comparação com a situação antes da privatização (168 milhões de euros de lucro para o estado em 1997 comparado a uma perda de 10 milhões de euros em 2003).[21] No Chile, onde não existiam estações de tratamento de esgoto antes da privatização, o desejo do governo de financiar sua construção fora do orçamento levou à privatização em 1998.[22]

Motivos financeiros para a privatização da água também são comuns em países onde o acesso à água e a qualidade do serviço são deficientes. Em cidades com favelas em rápido crescimento, é muito caro para o governo expandir sua infra-estrutura de sistemas de abastecimento de água ao ritmo do crescimento da população. Além disso, a manutenção das boas condições da infra-estrutura antiga também é cara.

Assim, se uma parcela significativa dos fundos públicos não for destinada à manutenção, as tubulações e estações de tratamento de águas residuais podem cair em desuso. Para alguns países, o custo de gerenciamento de um sistema público de abastecimento de água torna-se inacessível. Nestes casos, a privatização pode ser vista como uma solução possível para que os governos atraiam investimentos privados nacionais e internacionais.[23]

Prevalência de parcerias público-privadas

Prague is one of many cities whose water supply is provided by a private company

Há estimativas muito diferentes sobre o número de pessoas atendidas por empresas privadas de água. O Banco Mundial estimou que, em 2007, cerca de 270 milhões de pessoas receberam água de empresas privadas em mais de 40 países, incluindo cerca de 160 milhões em países desenvolvidos e 110 milhões em países em desenvolvimento. Entretanto, o relatório não incluiu estimativas do número de pessoas atendidas por empresas privadas no lado das águas residuais.

O Anuário Pinsent Masons Water usa uma definição mais ampla que inclui também os serviços de águas residuais. Mais importante, ele também inclui casos em que uma estação de tratamento de água ou esgoto é operada por uma empresa privada em nome de uma empresa pública que serve o cliente final. Com base nesta definição mais ampla e levando em conta o crescimento da população e a privatização da água entre 2007 e 2011, estima-se que 909 milhões em 62 países ou 13% da população mundial foram atendidos pelo setor privado de uma forma ou de outra.[24]

Isto inclui 309 milhões de pessoas na China, 61 milhões nos Estados Unidos, 60 milhões no Brasil, 46 milhões na França, 23 milhões na Espanha, 15 milhões na Índia e 14 milhões na Rússia. Na Inglaterra e no País de Gales, toda a população de 55 milhões é servida por empresas privadas. Além disso, no Chile, República Tcheca, Armênia e três países africanos - Costa do Marfim, Gabão e Senegal - empresas privadas prestam serviços de água a toda a população urbana. Na Hungria, elas atendem quase a metade da população. Na Argélia, Colômbia, Alemanha, Itália, Malásia, México, Marrocos, Polônia e África do Sul, menos da metade da população é servida por empresas privadas. Nas Filipinas, Indonésia, Bulgária, Estônia e Cuba, as empresas privadas de água atendem apenas a capital. 24 países, como Argentina, Bolívia e vários países pequenos como Guiana, Gana ou a República Centro-Africana, voltaram à gestão pública a partir de 2009.[24]

Entretanto, 84% dos contratos adjudicados principalmente nos anos 90 ainda estavam ativos. Por outro lado, em muitos países, como no Japão, Canadá, Egito, Paquistão ou Escandinávia, não existem empresas privadas de água. Nicarágua, Holanda e Uruguai até aprovaram leis que proíbem a privatização da água.[25] Na Itália, em junho de 2011, uma lei a favor da privatização da água foi revogada por uma maioria esmagadora de italianos através de um referendo.[26] Em 2019, Baltimore, Maryland tornou-se a primeira grande cidade dos Estados Unidos a proibir a privatização da água.[27]

EM TRADUÇÃO

A World Bank report lists the following examples of successful public-private partnerships in developing countries: the full privatization in Chile; the mixed companies in Colombia; the concessions in Guayaquil in Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Eastern Manila in the Philippines, Morocco, and Gabun; and the lease contracts in Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Yerevan in Armenia.[28]

Small-scale operators: the other private sector

A small scale private operator using a water tanker to distribute water

Beyond water privatization, which involves contractual relationships between a government and formally established large companies, there is also "the other private sector" in water supply consisting of small-scale, often informal local operators. They exist in most cities in the Global South and sometimes provide a large portion of the city's population with water. For example, a study of six Latin American countries showed that they provide water to 25% of the population in seven cities.[29][30] In Africa, they serve an estimated 50% of the urban population.[23] They mainly operate in slums, serving the people who are not catered to by the city authorities.[23] Many small-scale water operators provide water through tanker trucks or animal-drawn carts. Others operate water distribution networks fed by wells, as it is the case in Asunción, Paraguay, and in Sanaa, Yemen. Small-scale operators can be owned by individual entrepreneurs or can take the form of cooperatives, as it is the case in Honduras. Small-scale operators do not always comply with technical norms and the quality of the water they provide or their tariffs are often not regulated. More often than not, their tariffs are significantly higher than those of public water utilities.[23] This can attributed to either profiteering or simply the high transportation costs expended during the distribution of water.[23] They typically lack capital to further expand their network. However, in a few pilot cases – such as in Kenya, Uganda, Cambodia and Vietnam – international aid agencies have provided them with grants to increase access, often in the form of output-based aid.[31]

Selecting private operators

Private companies are typically selected through international competitive bidding and need to have demonstrated previous experience. Selection is either done through a combination of price and quality, or solely based on price. In the case of a management contract, the price is the management fee (fixed fee plus performance-based fee); in the case of a lease it is the lease fee per unit of water sold; in a concession it is the water tariff; and in an asset sale it is the price paid for the company.[32] In some cases – such as in Casablanca in 1997 and in Jakarta in 1998 – private companies have been selected through direct negotiations without competitive bidding. In other cases – such as in Cartagena (Colombia) in 1995, Cochabamba (Bolivia) in 1999 and Guayaquil (Ecuador) in 2000 – only a single bid was submitted. If development aid agencies are involved in directly financing private sector participation, they systematically require competitive bidding. However, in some cases – such as in Timişoara, Romania – the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has financed parallel investments, while a concession was awarded by the government after direct negotiations.[33]

Forms of regulation

Being monopolies, all water utilities – public or private – need to be regulated concerning tariff approvals, service quality, environmental compliance and other aspects. The awareness for the need to regulate typically increases substantially when profit-oriented private operators become involved: Monitoring the performance of both the private and the public partner, applying sanctions in case of non-compliance and dispute resolution become particularly important. The regulatory tasks depend on the form of private sector participation: Under a management contract the monitoring of the achievement of performance standards, on which the remuneration of the private company depends, is typically carried out by an independent consulting firm. Under a concession contract or in the case of an asset sale, tariff regulation through a regulatory agency or the government is a key regulatory function. Water concessions are frequently renegotiated, often resulting in better terms for the private company. For example, negotiations of concessions in Buenos Aires and Manila resulted in investment requirements being reduced, tariffs being increased and tariffs being indexed to the exchange rate to the US dollar.[34] The quality and strength of regulation is an important factor that influences whether water privatization fails or succeeds.[35] The tasks, form and capacity of the public entities charged with regulation vary greatly between countries.

Globally, regulation of private water companies is being carried out by the following types of public entities or, sometimes, a combination of them.

Type of entity charged with the regulation of private water providers Examples
Municipality or an association of smaller municipalities France and Spain
Specialized body at the city level set up to regulate a single contract Guayaquil, Ecuador; San Pedro Sula, Honduras; Jakarta, Indonesia (with some control by the national government in the latter case); Manila, Philippines; formerly in Buenos Aires, Argentina
Specialized regulatory agency at the supra-municipal sub-national level Public Utilities Commissions in U.S. states; some Brazilian states
Specialized regulatory agency set up permanently under law at the country level OFWAT in England; Water Superintendency SISS in Chile; Water Regulatory Commission CRA in Colombia
Specialized unit in a Ministry set up temporarily by decree Ministry of Water in Jordan
Ministerial department Ministry of Interior in Morocco

Examples of privatization

The best-known examples of water privatization in the late 20th century are those undertaken in England under Margaret Thatcher, the Manila and Buenos Aires concessions as well as the failed privatization in Cochabamba, Bolivia, which became a symbol of the struggle against globalization. Less well known, but just as relevant, are water privatizations in other countries, such as in Colombia.

France

Ver artigo principal: Water privatization in France

Private water firms have had a dominant role in France for more than a century. Private water firms (Veolia Water, Suez Environnement and smaller peers such as Saur) control 60 percent of France's water market. Veolia and Suez are the world's largest private international water and wastewater firms.[36]

Water privatization in France has been going on from before the 1800s but only recently, around the 1960s, has it grown in size and power. In the 20 years between the 1950s and 1970s it is estimated that the private water sector increased its share of potable water supply by at least 20%, a figure that has increased to around 75% in the current present. The water supply is now owned by three major companies. In the 3600 local municipalities in France each of them has the power to decide whether or not they publicize or privatize drinking water and dictate the terms of the contract.[37]

The funding of French Water Agencies is completely done in by themselves. Meaning that these companies are self-funded. The total revenue is hard to estimate but from 1992 to 1996 around 81 Billion French Francs were held in revenue by these Water Agencies. This large fund is mostly used to expand and maintain public and private water projects. This model, although very profitable, lacks economic regulation due to poor logistics. This is a problem which is in the process of being fixed by implementing a clear and well-defined contract between the Water Agencies and the contractors who build the infrastructure.[37]

England and Wales

In England and Wales, water tariffs and profits increased substantially after privatization in 1989, but investments also increased and water quality in rivers improved.[38] Tariffs increased by 46% in inflation-adjusted terms during the first nine years after privatization. Operating profits have more than doubled (+142%) in the first eight years. On the other hand, privatization increased investments: In the six years after privatization the companies invested £17 billion, compared to £9.3 billion in the six years before privatization.[38] It also brought about compliance with stringent drinking water standards and led to a higher quality of river water.[38] According to data from OFWAT, the economic regulator of water and sewer companies in England and Wales, from the early 1990s until 2010, network pressure has improved substantially, supply interruptions have become less frequent, the responsiveness to complaints has improved[39] and leakage has been reduced.[40]

In the 1980s the elite largely believed that the state was not building infrastructure for water in a manner that would allow the economy to grow appropriately. For this reason, the economic and political powerful spearhead a shift towards making water a privately owned utility.[41] Recently, the entire privatized water systems have been undergoing a complete restructuring. Small water companies in the UK have also been purchased by multinational companies from the United States, France and Scotland. The privately owned companies have been found to have trouble with water quality, environment pollution, sewage management, leakage and logistical errors.[42]

Manila, the Philippines

The private companies providing water in Manila have expanded access of water supply to the poor living in slums.

Water privatization in Manila began in 1997 with the award of two concession contracts for the Eastern and Western halves of Metro Manila. The concessions represent the largest population served by private operators in the developing world.[43] As of 2010, the concession in Eastern Manila is highly successful and has led to significant improvements in access, service quality and efficiency: the population served more than doubled from 3 in 1997 to 6.1 million in 2009, the share of customers with continuous water supply increased from 26% to more than 98% and non-revenue water declined from 63% to 16%.[44] The concession in Western Manila failed when the company Maynilad went bankrupt in 2003. It was sold to new investors in 2007 and performance has improved since then.[45] The share of the population with access to piped water in Western Manila increased from 67% in 1997 to 86% in 2006[46] and the share of customers that enjoys 24-hour water supply increased from 32% in 2007 to 71% in early 2011.[47]

Argentina

Ver artigo principal: Water privatization in Argentina

Water privatization in Argentina began in 1992 under the government of Carlos Menem as part of one of the world's largest privatization programs. Concessions were signed in 28% of the country's municipalities covering 60% of the population,[48] including in 1993 for the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires. After the 2001 economic crisis, under the government of Néstor Kirchner, almost all concessions were terminated, including in Buenos Aires in 2006. The impact of the concession remains controversial. The government and critics argue that the concessionaire failed to achieve the targets set under the concession contract in terms of expansion of access, investment and service quality.[49][50] Proponents concede that targets were not reached, but argue that a freeze in tariffs at the time of the devaluation of the Peso during the Argentinian economic crisis in 2001 violated the contract and thus made it impossible to achieve the original targets. According to the Argentinian economist Sebastian Galiani, the public company OSN had invested only US$25m per year between 1983 and 1993, while the private concessionaire Aguas Argentinas increased investments to around US$200m per year between 1993 and 2000.[51] According to the private concessionnaire Suez, during the 13-year-duration of its concession it extended access to water to 2 million people and access to sanitation to 1 million people, despite the economic crisis.[52][53] In July 2010 the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) ruled that the Argentinian government unfairly refused to allow the private concessionaires to raise tariffs during the period after the devaluation of the Argentine peso in 2001 and that the private companies are entitled to damages. The private companies announced that they would seek US$1.2bn in damages.[54]

Cochabamba, Bolivia

Ver artigo principal: Cochabamba Water War
Cochabamba was the scene of violent protests against water privatization in 2000.

In the mid-1990s the government of Bolivia, under pressure from the World Bank, decided to privatize water supply in the country's third largest city, Cochabamba. In the previous years, despite encumbered funds made available by the World Bank to support the public utility of Cochabamba, access to piped water in the city had decreased to 40%. Water losses had remained high at 40%, and water was supplied only 4 hours a day.[55] Those not connected to the network paid ten times as much for their water to private vendors as those who were.[56] This contrasted with the situation in Bolivia's second-largest city, Santa Cruz, where a utility run as a cooperative had managed to increase access and improve service quality with the support of the World Bank. In Santa Cruz, privatization had never been considered.[55]

In 1997, a first bid for a water concession in Cochabamba had been declared void at the request of the mayor of Cochabamba, Manfred Reyes Villa.[55] He wanted the construction of a large dam, the Misicuni dam, and a pipeline from the dam to the city to be included in the concession.[56] The World Bank had opposed the dam as unnecessarily expensive and subsequently ended its involvement related to water supply in the city.[55] Despite this, in the view of the public the World Bank remains inseparably linked to the Cochabamba privatization.

The government proceeded to bid out the concession; this time including the Misicuni dam. Only a single company submitted a bid, Aguas del Tunari, a consortium led by Bechtel.[57] The government accepted the bid and signed the concession.[56][57] The consortium was guaranteed a minimum 15% annual return.[56] In parallel, a law was passed that appeared to give a monopoly to Aguas del Tunari over all water resources, including water used for irrigation, communal water systems and even rainwater collected on roofs.[57] Upon taking control the company raised water tariffs by 35%.

Demonstrations and a general strike erupted in January 2000 in protest against the tariff increase and the perceived privatization of water resources. The government arrested the leader of the protesters, Oscar Olivera. However, the protests spread to the entire country and the government declared a state of emergency in April. Protests still continued and several people were killed. In the midst of the turmoil the employees of Aguas del Tunari fled from Cochabamba.[56] The government finally released Oscar Olivera and signed an agreement with him stating that the concession would be ended.[58] The government then told Aguas del Tunari that by leaving Cochabamba they had abandoned the concession and parliament revoked Law 2029. The Cochabamba protests became a worldwide symbol of struggle against neoliberalism and the Cochabamba privatization is probably, both among activists against globalization and the general public, by far the best known example of the failure of water privatization.

The company, insisting that it had been forced out, filed a $25 million lawsuit in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.[56] The proceedings, which were held behind closed doors, ended in 2006 with a settlement under which Bechtel dropped its claim.[59] With financing from the Inter-American Development Bank the city expanded its piped water system in the aftermath of the riots.[60] Nevertheless, under public management half of the 600,000 people of Cochabamba remain without piped water and those with it continue to receive intermittent service. Oscar Olivera the leading figure in the protests admitted, "I would have to say we were not ready to build new alternatives."[61]

Colombia

Ver artigo principal: Water privatization in Colombia
Cartagena is one of the Colombian cities whose water supply is provided by a mixed public-private company.

Between 1996 and 2007, public-private partnerships for water and sewer services in more than 40 Colombian cities were entered into, serving more than 20% of the country's urban population. Most of the contracts were awarded in municipalities with highly deteriorated infrastructure, such as Barranquilla and Cartagena. The central government financed most investments through grants, thus reducing the need to increase tariffs. Water privatization in Colombia was largely homegrown, adapting models used elsewhere to the particular circumstances and culture of Colombia.[62] A model introduced from Spain, the mixed company with a majority stake by the municipality and a minority stake by a private operator, was particularly successful. Foreign water companies won some of the early contracts, but quickly sold a majority of their shares to Colombian operators. There was a significant increase in access under private contracts. For example, in Cartagena, water supply coverage increased from 74 percent to almost universal coverage, while sewer coverage went up from 62 percent to 79 percent between 1996 and 2006. Half a million people gained access and 60 percent of the new connections benefited families in the poorest income quintile. To achieve universal coverage, the operator made extensive use of community bulk-supply schemes that provide safe water to the many illegal settlements that were expanding on the city's periphery. However, there is no conclusive evidence showing that access increased more rapidly under private contracts than in the case of publicly managed utilities. In Cartagena, tariffs declined substantially, indicating that the operator passed on efficiency gains to consumers.[63][64][65]

Cuba

In January 2000 when the socialist government of Cuba created a mixed public-private company to manage the water, sewer and stormwater drainage system in 8 of the 15 municipalities that make up the country's capital Havana. The government avoids the term privatization, despite the involvement of two foreign private companies as key partners in the mixed company. The company operates under a 25-year renewable concession contract. It serves 1.25 million inhabitants in the municipalities of Old Havana, Central Havana, Cerro, Plaza de la Revolución, 10 Octubre, La Lisa, Playa, and Marianao, which together are home to 60 percent of Havana's population. The company, called Aguas de la Habana, has a capital of 8 million USD and is owned by the Cuban state through the National Institute for Water Resources (INRH), the Spanish private company Aguas de Barcelona (Agbar) and the Spanish family firm Grupo Martinon. The contract foresees that ultimately the entire population of Havana will be served by the company.[66]

The cooperation between the three companies goes back to a project undertaken in the Cuban tourist resort Varadero since 1994, involving Canaragua, the subsidiary of Aguas de Barcelona operating in the Canary Islands, and the firm Martinon whose owners also come from the Canary Islands. After this successful initial experience, Agbar and INRH signed a contract to operate the water services in three municipalities La Lisa, Playa and Marianao in Western Havana in 1997. Following this pilot project, the creation of the mixed company Aguas de la Habana was decided in a framework agreement signed in February 1999 in Barcelona.[66]

Agbar "facilitated" 24.7 million USD of financing through loans.[66] [67] At least some of these loans are soft loans from the Spanish International Cooperation Agency, which financed the first ever major rehabilitation of the more than one century old Albear aqueduct that provides 12% of the capital's water supply.[68] In addition to operating and maintaining the systems, Aguas de La Habana also carries out engineering studies and executes works.

The company's annual billing is US$ 9m for about 115 million cubic meters of water it delivers to its customers.[69] As of 2004, Aguas de Barcelona reported significant progress. According to the company, 95 percent of the city's residents that had to be supplied by tanker trucks before the concession contract relied on tap water as of 2004. The continuity of supply had increased from 7 to 10 hours per day.[70] However, as of 2010 progress was apparently slow, as water distribution losses are still estimated at 50% in 2010 and more than 100,000 inhabitants suffer from intermittent supply.[71]


Impact of privatization

The evidence concerning the impact of water privatization is mixed. Often proponents and opponents of water privatization emphasize those examples, studies, methods and indicators that support their respective point of view. As with any empirical study, results are influenced by the methods used. For example, some studies simply compare the situation before privatization to the situation after privatization. More sophisticated studies try to compare the changes in privately managed utilities to those of publicly managed utilities that operate under similar conditions during the same period. The second group of studies often use econometric techniques. The results also depend on the choice of the indicator used to measure impact: One common indicator is the increase in access to water supply and sewerage. Other indicators are changes in tariffs, investments, water-borne diseases or indicators for service quality (e.g. continuity of supply or drinking water quality) and efficiency (e.g. water losses or labor productivity).

Impact on access

When it comes to impact on access to safe and clean water, it is inevitable to bring up public-private partnerships and tariff into spotlight, as they are one of the main factors determining one's ability to access water. A before after comparative study by World Bank analyzes how access, quality of service, operational efficiency and tariffs have evolved under 65 public-private partnerships for urban water utilities in developing countries. The study estimates that "PPP projects have provided access to piped water for more than 24 million people in developing countries since 1990".[72] Therefore, PPP had been a key significant in helping improved service quality of access to water.[72]

Apart from PPP, tariffs are also another important factor that directly impact one's access to safe and clean water. In some countries, water privatization can hinder the accessibility of water. When for-profit companies invest in the water system, the desire to make returns on the investment can create a top-heavy distribution system. They increase tariffs to earn more profits, which consequently reduces the accessibility of the resource for poor households since the poor are not able to pay high tariffs.[73] In other words, investments are only made to improve accessibility in richer districts where the people can pay the tariffs. In this manner, the water company's need to make adequate returns is met by supplying water only to those who can pay.[74] However, in other countries such as Nigeria and Ghana where the governments fail to distribute access to water to the people, water privatization led to expansion of services to low-income districts.[75]

Impact on health

One of the most effective measurement to analyze the effectiveness of water privatization is child mortality rate since children are more likely to be negatively affected by contaminated waters.[76] Water privatization has historically had mixed impacts on child mortality and the overall health of the people affected by it. A study of water privatization's impact on health finds that, between 1991 and 1997 in Argentina, areas where child mortality was upwards of 26% fell to just under 8% after water was privatized.[76] This occurred due to the regulations private water companies were held to which were more rigorous than their government-controlled counterparts. Along with this, development of water infrastructure in impoverished areas at the hands of private companies also positively affected child mortality rates. Governments are prone to privatize water companies, among other reasons, to better the quality of the water provided to the country's citizens.

In Argentina, water privatization did not fulfill many promises the citizens were expecting. This includes the expansion of sewerage treatment and connections and the reduction of the price of water, which actually increased. Along with this, the private water companies in Argentina needed help from the Argentine government to bypass regulatory agencies after it treated to cancel their contract due to conflicts of interest. It is also worth noting that many worker unions were opposed to privatizing water but their pleads were largely ignored by the Argentine government.[77]

The impact of water privatization on the amount of carcinogenic found in water is highly debated. In some cases, such as the case in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany, public water systems are likely to invest more money into making water quality good. Water companies working on a commercial basis might find it too costly to implement systems to better the water quality beyond what is necessary by law. Thus, posing a greater threat of containing harmful cancer-causing substances in the water.[78]

Impact on tariffs

Although the impact on tariffs cannot be fully concluded since each country has different policy on tariffs, water tariffs tend to be increased under privatization. For instance, in Buenos Aires and in Manila, tariffs first declined, but then increased above their initial level; in Cochabamba or in Guyana, tariffs were increased at the time of privatization. However, there are some other cases that tariffs under water privatization did not increase in a long run, typically in Sub-Saharan Africa, where most of investments are funded through development aid. For example, tariffs remained stable in Senegal, while in Gabon they declined by 50% in five years (2001–2006) and by 30% in ten years in Côte d'Ivoire (1990 to 2000).[79]

In addition, initial tariffs have been well below cost recovery levels in almost all cases, sometimes covering only a fraction of the cost of service provision. The magnitude of tariff increases is influenced by the profit margin of private operators, but also to a large extent by the efficiency of utilities in terms of water losses and labor productivity.

However, comparing water expenditure between private and public management in the U.S., a study of household water expenditures in cities under private and public management in the U.S. concludes that "whether water systems are owned by private firms or governments may, on average, simply not matter much."[80]

Impact on efficiency

According to a World Bank study in 2005, the most consistent improvement made by public-private partnerships in water supply was in operational efficiency. The study reviews the impact of private management on the efficiency of water utilities in many countries from many continents including Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe. Most evidences from the study suggests that "there is no statistically significant difference between the efficiency performance of public and private operators in this sector.".[81] In addition, a 2008 literature review by the Asian Development Bank shows that of 20 studies reviewed, only three show concrete evidence on technical efficiency improvements or cost reductions under private management.[82] Therefore, by 2005, private operator, at least, made an indirect contribution to financing by improving efficiency, making it possible for utilities to finance investments internally instead of having to rely on more debt.[28]

Profitability

An empirical study of 34 concessions in nine Latin American countries during the 1990s, including 10 water concessions in 5 countries (3 in Argentina, 1 in Bolivia, 1 in Brazil, 3 in Chile and 2 in Colombia), has estimated the profitability of concessions compared to the cost of capital of private companies. According to the study, contrary to public perception, the financial returns of private infrastructure concessions have been modest. The average annual return on capital employed was 7 percent. For a number of concessions, the returns have been below the cost of capital. On average telecommunications and energy concessions have fared much better than water concessions. Seven out of 10 water concessions had negative rates of return and two concessions had returns that were lower than the cost of capital of the private companies.[83]

Private water operators

Private water operators come in very different forms from multinational corporations to small enterprises. According to the Pinsent Masons Water Yearbook 2010–11, 909 million people (13% of the world population) were served by private operators. The largest private water companies are:

Domestic water operators have a strong presence in Brazil, Colombia, China, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Public water companies also sometimes participate in bids for private water contracts. For example, the Moroccan state-owned water utility ONEP has won a bid in Cameroon[84] and the Dutch publicly owned water firm Vitens has won a management contract in Ghana.

See also

Countries and cities with private sector participation in water supply as of 2013:

Countries which had private sector participation in water supply in the past:

References

  1. World Bank / Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility:Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in Developing Countries, by Philippe Marin, 2009, Overview, pp. 6-7.
  2. World Bank / Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility:Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in Developing Countries, by Philippe Marin, 2009, Overview, pp. 6-7.
  3. Private Water Saves Lives, Fredrik Segerfeldt, Cato Institute, 25 August 2005.
  4. Bailey, Ronald: "Water Is a Human Right: How privatization gets water to the poor" Reason Magazine, 17 August 2005.
  5. Lobina, Emanuele; Hall, David (June 2003). «Problems with private water concessions: a review of experience». Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU), University of Greenwich. Consultado em 18 June 2011  Verifique data em: |acessodata=, |data= (ajuda)
  6. Barlow, Maude:Blue Covenant: the Global Water Crisis and the Coming Battle for the Right to Water. New York, 2008. ISBN 978-1-59558-186-0.
  7. Lohan, Tara: Fighting the Corporate Theft of Our Water, AlterNet, 25 April 2007.
  8. Finger, Matthias & Jeremy Allouche (2002):Water Privatisation: Transnational corporations and the re-regulation of the global water industry, Spon Press, ISBN 978-0-415-23208-1.
  9. Beschluss Nationalrat Österreich die Verfassung zu ändern, Result of the vote of the Austrian Parliament to amend the constitution that Water, and its Distribution is a public good, 2019-07-02
  10. <Nationalrat stimmt für Glyphosatverbot, Austrian parliament votes to forbid Glyphosphat & water is a public good necessary for the existence of a human, orf.at, 2019-07-02>
  11. Lobina, Emanuele; Hall, David (June 2003). «Problems with private water concessions: a review of experience». Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU), University of Greenwich. Consultado em 18 June 2011  Verifique data em: |acessodata=, |data= (ajuda)
  12. Steadman, Lis. «East to West: the Future of Water?». WaterWorld. Consultado em 26 January 2012. The figures are quoted from the Pinsent Masons' 12th Annual Water Yearbook  Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
  13. Edwards, Chris (Winter 2017). «Margaret Thatcher's Privatization Legacy» (PDF). The Cato Journal. 37: 89–101  Verifique data em: |data= (ajuda)
  14. Bertrand Dardenne:Avant le public était le privé (before the public was the private), in:Aymeric Blanc and Sarah Botton:Services d'eau privé dans les pays en développement (Private water services in developing countries), Agence française de développement, 2011, pp. 31, 35.
  15. Werle, Hermann (August 2004). «Zwischen Gemeinwohl und Profitinteresse (Between the Common Good and Profit Seeking): Erfahrungen bei der Teilprivatisierung der Wasserwirtschaft in Berlin (Experiences with the partial water privatization in Berlin)» (PDF) (em alemão). Brot für die Welt: Hintergrund-Materialien 13. 26 páginas. Consultado em 9 October 2013. Arquivado do original (PDF) em 25 de março de 2012  Verifique data em: |acessodata=, |data= (ajuda)
  16. Beveridge, Ross (June 2017). "The partial-privatisation of the Berlin Water Company in 1999 and urban development in 1990s Berlin"[ligação inativa] (PDF). Waterlat-Gobacit Network Working Paper. 4: 27–40.
  17. National Association of Water Companies. «Public-Private Partnerships». Consultado em 20 December 2011  Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
  18. Correa-Parra, Juan; Vergara-Perucich, José Francisco; Aguirre-Nuñez, Carlos (1 December 2020). «Water Privatization and Inequality: Gini Coefficient for Water Resources in Chile». Water. 12 (12). 3369 páginas. doi:10.3390/w12123369Acessível livremente  Verifique data em: |data= (ajuda)
  19. Bertrand Dardenne:Avant le public était le privé (before the public was the private), in:Aymeric Blanc and Sarah Botton:Services d'eau privé dans les pays en développement (Private water services in developing countries), Agence française de développement, 2011, pp. 38-45.
  20. a b c d Greiner, Patrick Trent (2020). «Community water system privatization and the water access crisis». Sociology Compass (em inglês). 14 (5): e12785. ISSN 1751-9020. doi:10.1111/soc4.12785 
  21. Werle, Hermann (August 2004). «Zwischen Gemeinwohl und Profitinteresse (Between the Common Good and Profit Seeking): Erfahrungen bei der Teilprivatisierung der Wasserwirtschaft in Berlin (Experiences with the partial water privatization in Berlin)» (PDF) (em alemão). Brot für die Welt: Hintergrund-Materialien 13. 26 páginas. Consultado em 9 October 2013. Arquivado do original (PDF) em 25 de março de 2012  Verifique data em: |acessodata=, |data= (ajuda)
  22. Larrain, Sara (2012). «Human Rights and Market Rules in Chile's Water Conflicts: A Call for Structural Changes in Water Policy». Environmental Justice (em inglês). 5 (2): 82–88. ISSN 1939-4071. doi:10.1089/env.2011.0020 
  23. a b c d e Dagdeviren, Hulya; Robertson, Simon A. (2011). «Access to Water in the Slums of Sub-Saharan Africa». Development Policy Review (em inglês). 29 (4): 485–505. ISSN 1467-7679. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7679.2011.00543.x 
  24. a b «Pinsent Masons Water Yearbook 2011–2012». Consultado em 25 March 2012  Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
  25. No Uruguai, um referendo iniciado pela sociedade civil proibindo a privatização da água foi aprovado em outubro de 2004. A lei que proíbe a privatização do abastecimento público de água nos Países Baixos foi aprovada em setembro de 2004, com amplo apoio interpartidário.
  26. «Berlusconi accepts nuclear blow». BBC News (em inglês). 14 de junho de 2011. Consultado em 3 de abril de 2020 
  27. «Baltimore votes to become first large U.S. city to ban water privatization». Reuters. 7 November 2018. Consultado em 6 de abril de 2019  Verifique data em: |data= (ajuda)
  28. a b Erro de citação: Etiqueta <ref> inválida; não foi fornecido texto para as refs de nome ppiaf.org2
  29. Solo, Tova (2003). «Independent water entrepreneurs in Latin America – the other private sector in water services». World Bank. Consultado em 18 June 2011  Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
  30. The study covered Córdoba, Argentina; Barranquilla, Colombia; Asunción, Paraguay; Guatemala City, Guatemala; and three cities in Peru (Lima, Cuzco and Ica). The cooperative of Santa Cruz, Bolivia, is also covered in the study, but is a special case, since it serves the entire city and operates more like a formal utility.
  31. «Supporting small providers in poor and underserved communities». World Bank. Consultado em 18 June 2011  Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
  32. «Approaches to Private Participation in Water Services – A Toolkit» (PDF). World Bank/Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility. pp. 167–179. Consultado em 18 June 2011  Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
  33. Lobina, Emanuele; Hall, David (June 2003). «Problems with private water concessions: a review of experience». Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU), University of Greenwich. pp. 6–7. Consultado em 18 June 2011  Verifique data em: |acessodata=, |data= (ajuda)
  34. Lobina, Emanuele; Hall, David (June 2003). «Problems with private water concessions: a review of experience». Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU), University of Greenwich. pp. 10–12. Consultado em 18 June 2011  Verifique data em: |acessodata=, |data= (ajuda)
  35. Gunatilake, Herath and Mary Jane F. Carangal–San Jose:Privatization Revisited: Lessons from Private Sector Participation in Water Supply and Sanitation in Developing Countries, Asian Development Bank, ERD Working Paper No. 115, 2008, p. 19.
  36. Paris's return to public water supplies makes waves beyond France
  37. a b Neto, Frederico (May 1998). «Water privatization and regulation in England and France: a tale of two models». Natural Resources Forum. 22 (2): 107–117. ISSN 0165-0203. doi:10.1111/j.1477-8947.1998.tb00718.x  Verifique data em: |data= (ajuda)
  38. a b c Water privatization and regulation in England and Wales, by Caroline van den Berg 1997.
  39. OFWAT:Service and delivery – performance of the water companies in England and Wales 2009–10, p. 21. Retrieved 16 June 2011.
  40. OFWAT:Service and delivery – performance of the water companies in England and Wales 2009–10, p. 40. Retrieved 16 June 2011.
  41. Page, Ben; Bakker, Karen (2005). «Water governance and water users in a privatised water industry: participation in policy-making and in water services provision: a case study of England and Wales». International Journal of Water. 3 (1). 38 páginas. ISSN 1465-6620. doi:10.1504/ijw.2005.007158 
  42. Lobina, Emanuele. (2001). UK water privatisation : a briefing. [S.l.]: Public Services International Research Unit. OCLC 612915200 
  43. World Bank / Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility:Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in Developing Countries, by Philippe Marin, 2009, p. 114.
  44. Regulation and corporate innovation:The case of Manila Water, by Perry Rivera, in:Transforming the world of water, Global Water Summit 2010, Presented by Global Water Intelligence and the International Desalination Association.
  45. Wu, Xun; Malaluan, Nepomuceno A. (2008). «A Tale of Two Concessionaires: A Natural Experiment of Water Privatisation in Metro Manila». Urban Studies. 45 (1): 207–229, 212–217. doi:10.1177/0042098007085108 
  46. Philippe Marin:Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities, World Bank, 2009, p. 56f.
  47. Maynilad:Maynilad doubles 24-hr service coverage under MPIC, DMCI, 18 January 2011.
  48. Galiani, Sebastian; Gertler, Paul; Schargrodsky, Ernesto (31 August 2002). «Water for Life: The Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality» (PDF). p. 9. Consultado em 10 October 2013. Cópia arquivada (PDF) em 10 April 2008  Verifique data em: |acessodata=, |arquivodata=, |data= (ajuda)
  49. A Loftus and DA McDonald. 2001. Of Liquid Dreams: A Political Ecology of Water Privatization in Buenos Aires, Environment and Urbanization, Volume 12, Number 2, pp. 179–200.
  50. Solanes, Miguel (2006). Efficiency, Equity, and Liberalisation of Water Services in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Industry, Services & Trade. 2006. [S.l.]: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). pp. 124–148. ISBN 978-92-64-02867-8 , p. 168.
  51. Galiani, Sebastian; Gertler, Paul; Schargrodsky, Ernesto (31 August 2002). «Water for Life: The Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality» (PDF). p. 15. Consultado em 14 February 2008. Cópia arquivada (PDF) em 10 April 2008  Verifique data em: |acessodata=, |arquivodata=, |data= (ajuda)
  52. Suez Environment. «Argentinian official website». Consultado em 18 February 2008. Cópia arquivada em 15 December 2007  Verifique data em: |acessodata=, |arquivodata= (ajuda)
  53. Sarah Botton, Alexandre Braïlowsky and Sarah Matthieussent:The real obstacles to universal access to the water service in developing countries:Thoughts stemming from the experience of access to drinking water of the poor neighbourhoods populations living in Port-au-Prince (Haiti) and Buenos Aires (Argentina), May 2005, pp. 15-18, 31.
  54. Global Water Intelligence:Suez seeks $1.2bn in damages in Argentina, Vol 11, Issue 8 (August 2010). Retrieved 17 October 2010.
  55. a b c d World Bank:Bolivia Water Management: A Tale of Three Cities, Operations Evaluation Department Précis, Spring 2002, Number 222. Retrieved 31 December 2010.
  56. a b c d e f Finnegan, William (8 April 2002). «Leasing The Rain». The New Yorker. Consultado em 29 June 2016  Verifique data em: |acessodata=, |data= (ajuda)
  57. a b c Nash, June C. (2002). Social Movements: An Anthropological Reader. United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing 
  58. «Timeline:Cochabamba Water Revolt». PBS. June 2002. Consultado em 15 February 2007  Verifique data em: |acessodata=, |data= (ajuda)
  59. Opinio Juris:Bechtel Abandons its ICSID Claim Against Bolivia, 10 February 2006. Retrieved 11 June 2011.
  60. Inter-American Development Bank:IDB maintains US$18.6mn for Cochabamba waterworks, 24 June 2002.
  61. Forero, Juan (14 December 2005). «Bolivia regrets IMF experiment». The New York Times. Consultado em 29 June 2016  Verifique data em: |acessodata=, |data= (ajuda)
  62. World Bank (2006). «Local Solutions Improve Water Supply and Sanitation Services in Colombia» (PDF). Consultado em 2 March 2008  Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
  63. Gomes-Lobo, Andrés, and M. Melendez: Social Policy, Regulation and Private Sector Participation: the Case of Colombia. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) Working Paper, April 2007, Geneva.
  64. World Bank / Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility:Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in Developing Countries, by Philippe Marin, 2009, pp. 37-38, 43, 60.
  65. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (2006). «When a water meter is worth more than a house». Consultado em 2 March 2008. Cópia arquivada em 29 September 2007  Verifique data em: |acessodata=, |arquivodata= (ajuda)
  66. a b c Aguas de la Habana. «Nuestra empresa». Consultado em 27 December 2011  Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
  67. Grupo Martinon. «Aguas de La Habana». Consultado em 27 December 2011  Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
  68. Aguas de Habana. «Acueductos de la Ciudad». Consultado em 27 December 2011  Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
  69. Agbar (Link broken)
  70. Fernando Rayón Martín Xavier Segura Ayala (2004). «LA GESTIÓN PRIVADA DEL AGUA EN ESPAÑA Y AMÉRICA LATINA: EL CASO DE AGBAR.». Sector Agua y Saneamiento del Grupo Agbar. Consultado em 16 February 2014  Verifique data em: |acessodata= (ajuda)
  71. El Mundo:La Habana y sus aguas perdidas(Havanna and its lost waters), 26 January 2010
  72. a b Marin, Philippe (22 de setembro de 2009). Public Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in Developing Countries (em inglês). [S.l.]: World Bank Publications. ISBN 978-0-8213-7957-8 
  73. Labonte, Ronald (2004). Fatal indifference: the G8, Africa and global health. [S.l.]: IDRC 
  74. Salina, Irena, dir. Flow. Prod. Steven Starr. Oscilloscope, 2008. Film. 20 May 2013.
  75. «Item Details Page for From curiosity to commodity: a review of the evolution of sachet drinking water in West Africa». soka.on.worldcat.org. Consultado em 21 de novembro de 2020 
  76. a b Galiani, Sebastian; Gertler, Paul; Schargrodsky, Ernesto (31 August 2002). «Water for Life: The Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality» (PDF). p. 1. Consultado em 14 February 2008. Cópia arquivada (PDF) em 10 April 2008  Verifique data em: |acessodata=, |arquivodata=, |data= (ajuda)
  77. Loftus, A. J (1 de outubro de 2001). «Of liquid dreams: a political ecology of water privatization in Buenos Aires». Environment and Urbanization. 13 (2): 179–199. ISSN 0956-2478. doi:10.1177/095624780101300215 
  78. Wilhelm, Michael; Bergmann, Sabine; Dieter, Hermann H. (June 2010). «Occurrence of perfluorinated compounds (PFCs) in drinking water of North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany and new approach to assess drinking water contamination by shorter-chained C4–C7 PFCs». International Journal of Hygiene and Environmental Health. 213 (3): 224–232. ISSN 1438-4639. PMID 20556880. doi:10.1016/j.ijheh.2010.05.004  Verifique data em: |data= (ajuda)
  79. World Bank / Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility: Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in Developing Countries, by Philippe Marin, 2009, pp. 107-116.
  80. Wallsten, Scott and Katrina Kosec:"Public or Private Drinking Water? The Effects of Ownership and Benchmark Competition on U.S. Water System Regulatory Compliance and Household Water Expenditures", Brookings Institution Working Paper 05-05. (March 2005).
  81. Antonio Estache(World Bank and ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles), Sergio Perelman (CREPP, Université de Liège), Lourdes Trujillo (DAEA, Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria): World Bank Infrastructure Performance and Reform in Developing and Transition Economies: Evidence from a Survey of Productivity Measures, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3514, February 2005, pp. 11-13.
  82. Gunatilake, Herath and Mary Jane F. Carangal–San Jose: Privatization Revisited: Lessons from Private Sector Participation in Water Supply and Sanitation in Developing Countries, Asian Development Bank, ERD Working Paper No. 115, 2008, p. 13.
  83. Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility / World Bank:How Profitable Are Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America? Empirical Evidence and Regulatory Implications, January 2005, by Sophie Sirtaine, Maria Elena Pinglo, J. Luis Guasch and Vivien Foster.
  84. Business Cameroon: Drinking water: the partnership ONEP-CAMWATER, 13 August 2010.

Further reading

External links

Wikcionário
Wikcionário
O Wikcionário tem o verbete publification.
Multimedia

Predefinição:Natural resources Predefinição:Portal bar


References